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Coming together is a beginning, staying together is progress, and working together is success. 




Strategic alliances, which are defined as voluntarily initiated cooperative 
agreements between independent firms that involve exchange, sharing, or co-
development (Gulati & Singh, 1998), and acquisitions, which are defined as 
transactions in which one firm purchases a majority stake in another firm and takes 
control over it (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002), are typically viewed as external 
sourcing strategies that enable firms to complement and supplement their internal 
resources and capabilities (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). When studying alliances 
and acquisitions, scholars tend to look at them separately (Gulati, 1995; Lavie, 
2007; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro; 2010; Wang & Zajac, 2007). However, alliances may, 
in reality, be intertwined in acquisitions. More precisely, when a firm acquires 
another firm that is engaged in strategic alliances, it gains access not only to the 
internal attributes of the acquired firm but also to that firm’s alliances.  
The traditional alliance (portfolio) literature focuses exclusively on 
alliances formed by the focal firms themselves, which I refer to in this dissertation 
as homegrown alliances. Scholars implicitly assume that engagement in alliances 
is an outcome of a rational strategic process undertaken by the allying firms 
(Wassmer, 2010). However, as described above, firms might have alliances in their 
portfolios that were not the result of their own initiative. In particular, when firms 
decide to acquire another firm, they are often confronted with the alliance 
agreements of the acquired firm. I conceptualize this particular type of alliance as 
an inherited alliance, as the acquiring firm inherits the responsibilities for these 
alliances from the acquired firm. Figure 1.1. illustrates this phenomenon by 
presenting the alliance portfolio of the biotechnology company Gilead Sciences as 
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of 1999. The figure demonstrates that the firm not only had access to eight 
homegrown alliances but also to six alliances of the acquired firm, NeXstar. 
  





















Al liances that Gilead inheri ted in the                     
acquisition of NeXstar, Inc. (1999)
 
Similar to the alliance (portfolio) literature, the acquisition literature has 
largely neglected the phenomenon of inherited alliances. Previous acquisition 
research provides important insights into how acquiring firms can benefit from the 
resources and capabilities of an acquired firm (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Lamont, 
King, Maslach, Schwerdtfeger, & Tienari, 2019; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). 
However, scholars studying acquisitions have focused on the internal attributes of 
acquired firms and have largely ignored the fact that acquired firms often have their 
own inter-firm relations in the form of strategic alliances. This observation is also 
illustrated by Figure 1.1., which shows that acquired firms provide access to 
resources embedded in their internal boundaries as well as resources that are 
shared inter-organizationally. 
Firms themselves point to the fact that inherited alliances should not be 
ignored. For example, in its 1999 annual statement, Gilead Sciences referred to the 
 13 
 
alliances in which NeXstar was engaged as potential sources of disruption, stating 
“it [Gilead] will not be able to control whether the corporate partners will devote 
sufficient resources to its programs or products,” “disputes may arise in the future 
with respect to the ownership of rights to technology developed with corporate 
partners,” and “disagreements could result in litigation or arbitration.” This 
indicates that inherited alliances may carry risks that can have implications for the 
inheriting firms. Neither these risks nor their potential consequences are captured 
by extant theories on value creation from alliances and acquisitions. 
Within this context, I aim to enhance our understanding of the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances. In the reminder of this chapter, I briefly 
describe the unique characteristics of inherited alliances. Subsequently, I outline 
the three empirical research projects I conducted to fulfill my research objective. I 
close the chapter with an explanation of my motivation for choosing the 
biotechnology sector as the research context.  
1.1. INHERITED ALLIANCES   
Inherited alliances are the strategic partnership of an acquired firm that an 
acquiring firm inherits through an acquisition. These alliances have several unique 
characteristics that differentiate them from homegrown alliances. Typically, when 
a firm identifies a need to improve its internal resources and capabilities, it will 
consider forming one or more alliances (Das & Teng, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 
2010). Consequently, the firm will need to undertake a search process in order to 
find a suitable partner given its specific internal needs. After a firm has successfully 
scouted out a potential partner, it will approach it and, assuming the presence of 
mutual will, engage in alliance negotiations (Ariño & Reuer, 2004). Consequently, 
by initiating alliances themselves, firms are able to define alliance goals, mutual 
responsibilities, and necessary contributions, and to agree on how to collaborate 
(Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Das & Teng, 2002; Stuart, 1998). However, despite the 
implicit assumptions in the alliance literature, not all alliances are homegrown. 
Therefore, not all firms enjoy the benefits associated with defining an alliance from 
the beginning.  
In a similar vein, acquisition research has mainly focused on the internal 
attributes of the acquired firm and neglected the fact that acquired firms may also 
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be involved in inter-firm relations in which shared resources are embedded (see 
Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2017, for an overview). This implies that the 
acquiring firm assumes the responsibilities and liabilities the acquired firm has in 
relation to its alliance partners. The management of these responsibilities and 
liabilities is likely to be challenging, as inherited alliances have a pre-existing 
character. In other words, they are pre-designed with respect to their purpose and 
their formal (e.g., contract) and informal (e.g., collaboration routines) 
management mechanisms. Consequently, acquiring firms may experience 
substantial information asymmetries that greatly increase their information-
processing needs. The additional managerial and resource requirements may put a 
strain on the acquiring firm’s personnel and leave its employees cognitively 
overloaded. In addition, while pursuing an acquisition is an intended action, 
inheriting alliances are seen as an unintended but inevitable secondary 
consequence of acquisition activity that not only causes an unintended punctuated 
change in the acquiring firm’s collection of alliances but also creates resource 
demands.  
 Furthermore, while inherited alliances have the potential to influence the 
acquiring firm, the alliances themselves can also be affected. An acquisition of an 
alliance partner by a third party implies a change in the partner configuration, 
which can be a source of instability in an alliance (Bakker, 2016; Das & Teng, 
2000). An acquisition of an alliance partner is likely to disrupt established patterns 
of interactions, thereby threatening the alliance’s existence.  
Taken together, inherited alliances exhibit unique characteristics that 
differentiate them from homegrown alliances. To theorize on this phenomenon and 
to learn more about the nature of inherited alliances, I conducted explorative 
interviews with practitioners. These insights help in the development of a baseline 
understanding of this phenomenon. I also utilize the theoretical concepts of 
information asymmetry and inter-firm coordination to explain the challenges 
inherited alliances pose to the acquiring firm and how they influence the inherited 
alliance’s resilience. Furthermore, I apply the coordination-autonomy framework 
from the acquisition literature (e.g., Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006) to 
enhance our understanding of the post-acquisition integration choices made in the 
presence of inherited alliances.  
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1.2. OVERVIEW OF THE THREE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
PROJECTS 
My overarching goal in this dissertation is to introduce and explore the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances in order to stimulate future research that 
explores this phenomenon from both the alliance and acquisition perspectives. To 
fulfill this research objective, I conducted three empirical projects on inherited 
alliances in the biotechnology industry. Each of the projects addresses a unique 
research question and provides insights into strategic alliances in the context of 
acquisitions from a different perspective. In Chapter 2, I take an alliance portfolio 
view, and explore the role and firm performance implications of inherited alliances. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that the acquired firm can play a navigator role in addressing 
challenges posed by inherited alliances, and I study the resilience of alliances to the 
acquisition of an alliance partner by a third party. In Chapter 4, based on the 
argument that the acquired firm’s in-house resources and capabilities are not the 
only drivers of post-acquisition integration choices, I explore the role of inter-firm 
relations between the acquired firm and its alliance partners in the acquirer’s 
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1.2.1. Project 1: The Role of Inherited Alliances and Their Implications 
for Firm Performance 
In Chapter 2, I point to an important shortcoming in alliance portfolio literature. 
Typically, alliance researchers assume that the collaborating partners are also the 
alliance initiators. In this chapter, I highlight that in addition to engaging in 
alliances, firms also inherit alliances through acquisitions (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002). More specifically, the acquiring firm not only becomes the owner of the 
acquired firm but also inherits that firm’s alliances. As a result, a focal firm’s 
alliance portfolio encompasses homegrown alliances as well as inherited alliances. 
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Hence, I extend alliance typologies and aim to move alliance (portfolio) research 
forward by enhancing our understanding of the kinds of alliances that may be 
found in a portfolio and how these different alliance types help or hamper firms in 
their efforts to create value through their alliances and alliance portfolios.  
 I use a mixed-method approach to explore this gap in the literature. I start 
with a qualitative exploration of the phenomenon of inherited alliances, which 
provides insights into the nature of inherited alliances. Subsequently, I provide an 
overview of the challenges and opportunities highlighted by senior biotechnology 
executives. The interview findings show that inherited alliances can have both 
negative and positive implications. To quantitatively test these insights, I construct 
a novel panel dataset covering the alliance activities of 39 biotechnology firms from 
1996 to 2010. 
1.2.2. Project 2: The Role of the Acquired Firm in the Resilience of 
Inherited Alliances 
In Chapter 3, I look at the acquisition of an alliance partner by a third firm from 
the perspective of the change in the alliance partner configuration and posit that 
this type of change may threaten the alliance’s stability. This particular type of post-
formation change is theoretically different from other configurational partner 
changes, such as partner exit or entry. The theoretical uniqueness comes from the 
fact that an acquisition of an alliance partner by a third firm implies that although 
the acquiring firm formally replaces the acquired firm as the partner in the alliance, 
the resources of the acquired alliance partner remain present in the alliance. For 
that reason, the acquired alliance partner can still play a role in the alliance and it 
can attenuate the level of disruption associated with the acquisition of one of the 
alliance partners. As such, the goal of the second project is to examine the 
conditions under which the acquired firm can more effectively play the navigator 
role. 
 I outline the core challenges faced by acquiring firms, including 
information asymmetries and coordination problems. I then elaborate on the two 
roles that the acquired firm can adopt to address these challenges: knowledge 
broker and relational mediator. Consequently, I identify the conditions (i.e., 
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technological relatedness between the acquired firm and the inherited alliance 
partner, and the history of collaboration between the acquired firm and the 
inherited alliance partner) that shape the acquired alliance partner’s ability to 
execute this navigating role. Finally, based on insights from the acquisition 
literature, I consider the post-acquisition integration strategy and its impact on 
inherited alliance’s resilience. To test the hypotheses, I construct a novel dataset 
covering 213 alliances that 24 firms from the biotechnology sector inherited 
through acquisitions over a period of fifteen years. 
1.2.3. Project 3: The Role of Inherited Alliances in Post-Acquisition 
Governance 
In Chapter 4, I present the third and final project of this dissertation. The extant 
acquisition literature acknowledges that an acquired firm brings its intra-
organizational resources and capabilities into the acquiring firm, and that these 
resources and capabilities influence the integration decision. However, the extant 
research largely neglects the fact that some acquired firms may also have inter-
organizational relations—strategic alliances—in which resources and capabilities 
are embedded. Based on insights from the resource-based view, the acquisition 
literature, and the alliance literature, I investigate how the inherited alliances 
influence acquisition governance, especially post-acquisition strategic-integration 
choices.  
 I argue that in addition to considering the acquired firm’s intra-
organizational resources, it is important to take into account the inter-
organizational relations in which the acquired firm has shared resources and 
capabilities. I use insights from the acquisition literature to argue that in 
acquisitions that involve inherited alliances, the resources and capabilities of the 
acquired firm are dispersed across the acquired firm and the inherited alliances. 
The greater the number of inherited alliances, the greater the dispersion of 
resources and, hence, the lower the number of value-creating opportunities 
available to the acquiring firm. At the same time, I argue that a higher number of 
inherited alliances implies more interfaces through which the resources can be 
accessed, which can trigger more conflicts and, thus, increase the value-disruption 
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risks. Therefore, I expect the likelihood of a preservation strategy to increase as the 
number of inherited alliances rises. I also posit that if the acquiring firm and the 
acquired firm were involved in an alliance prior to the acquisition, the baseline 
effect will be attenuated due to a familiarity advantage and the acquiring firm will 
more likely to absorb the acquired firm. To test these hypotheses, I utilize a dataset 
covering 100 acquisitions performed by 32 of the largest biotechnology firms 
between 1996 and 2010. 
1.3. MOTIVATION FOR STUDYING THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
The empirical setting of this dissertation is the biotechnology industry. I chose this 
sector for two main reasons: the relevance of both alliances and acquisitions, and 
the availability of rich secondary data. First, a study of inherited alliances must 
focus on an industry in which both acquisitions and alliances are frequently used 
as growth vehicles. In the biotechnology industry, development occurs quickly. If 
firms want to keep up with the competition, they need to speed up their innovation 
processes through external sourcing. Biotech firms consistently emphasize the 
need for acquisitions and alliances to develop outstanding technologies and 
medical products, which should ultimately help people restore their health and 
save lives.  
 Second, archival data on acquisitions and alliances initiated by 
biotechnology firms is widely available. Firms often offer information about new 
initiatives to the media, announce these initiatives on their websites, and mention 
them in their annual reports and/or US Securities Exchange Commission filings. I 
was able to collect approximately 70,000 press releases with relevant alliance and 
acquisition information, which I complimented with data from more than 600 
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Whereas extant alliance portfolio research focuses on homegrown alliances – i.e., 
alliances that have been initiated by the focal firm, we focus our attention on the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances – i.e., alliances that have been inherited by the 
focal firm by means of an acquisition. Based on in-depth interviews we find strong 
indications that, next to specific challenges, inherited alliances also trigger 
capability-building opportunities, which are most outspoken in inherited 
explorative alliances. Analyzing quantitative data on both the homegrown and 
inherited alliance activities of biotechnology firms, we subsequently provide 
further evidence for these observations, demonstrating a positive effect of inherited 
explorative alliances on financial performance. Jointly, our findings shed new light 
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Alliances are important strategies to complement and supplement firms’ internal 
resources and capabilities (Das & Teng, 2000; Grand & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lavie 
& Singh, 2012). Initially, alliance research has focused on the formation, 
governance, and performance implications. More recently, this research has been 
complemented by an additional stream focusing on the composition and 
management of alliance portfolios and networks (Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; 
Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 2010). This community of alliance researchers typically 
assumes that the involved partners also are the initiators of the alliances. However, 
this does not always need to be the case. For instance, apart from engaging in 
alliances, firms also initiate acquisitions (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Such 
acquisitions imply that the acquiring firm does not only become owner of the 
acquired firm, but also inherits the alliances of this acquired firm. As a result, the 
alliance portfolio of focal firms does not only encompass homegrown alliances – 
i.e., alliances that have been initiated by the focal firm, but also entails inherited 
alliances – i.e., alliances that have been inherited by the focal firm by means of an 
acquisition. The core objective of this paper is to increase our understanding of the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances, exploring how inherited alliances are different 
from homegrown alliances, and to what extent inherited alliance impact the 
financial performance of focal firms. 
 Exploring the particular phenomenon of inherited alliances is important 
due to several reasons. First, when looking at industries such as biotechnology, in 
which both alliances and acquisitions are common strategies to source new 
capabilities (Dyer, Kale & Singh, 2004; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002), we observe 
that inherited alliances are a frequent phenomenon, constituting on average eight 
percent of firms’ alliance portfolios and in some cases even reaching values as high 
as 80 percent. At the same time, scanning the broad set of studies on alliances in 
the biotechnology industry (e.g., Deeds & Hill, 1999; Liebeskind Oliver, Zucker, & 
Brewer, 1996; Oliver, 2001; Reuer & Zollo, 2000; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; 
Santoro & McGill, 2005), we notice that these alliances tend to be ignored both 
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from an empirical1 and conceptual point of view. This implies that extant alliance 
research might provide a biased perspective on the actual composition of firms’ 
alliance portfolio. Second, we expect that inherited alliances are theoretically 
different from homegrown alliances. Extant research on alliance formation and 
governance (Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Malhorta & Lumineau, 
2011; Nielsen 2010; Reuer & Ariño, 2007) has emphasized the importance of the 
initial negotiation stage of alliances. In particular, this stage has been described as 
being crucial for establishing trustful relationships between alliance actors and for 
establishing a common ground on the objectives of the collaborative endeavor. 
Post-formation changes have therefore been described as challenging events that 
can distort established psychological contracts between alliance partners and can 
lead to misunderstandings and conflicts, which can jeopardize value creation in the 
alliance (Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). From this perspective, we could 
expect that inherited alliances are an unpopular phenomenon and that focal firms 
would prefer to terminate them as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, based on a 
first scanning of inherited alliances in the biotechnology industry, we find that the 
vast majority of inherited alliances is not terminated by the acquiring firm. Only 
about 20 % of the inherited alliances were terminated in the first months post 
acquisition. 
 In sum, whereas extant alliance research tends to exclusively focus on 
homegrown alliances, inherited alliances are a frequent phenomenon, which is 
expected to have performance implications that are different from homegrown 
alliances. In order to explore this phenomenon, we proceeded in two steps. First, 
we conducted 12 in-depth interviews to better understand the nature and potential 
performance implications of inherited alliances. Subsequently, we empirically 
tested the implications of inherited alliances on the financial performance of focal 
firms, relying on panel data for a sample of 39 biotechnology firms. 
 Our interviews confirm that inherited alliances trigger challenges that are 
not present in homegrown alliances. However, interviewees also stressed several 
                                                 
1 To the best of our knowledge only two recently published papers by Asgari, Singh, and Mitchell (2017) 
and Bos, Noseleit, and Faems (2017) consider in their methodological approaches the alliances that 
were inherited by focal firms via acquisitions. However, these papers do not develop a clear conceptual 
differentiation between homegrown and inherited alliances nor explore the performance implications 
of inherited alliances. 
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advantages (i.e., higher ability to avoid propinquity traps, increased agility) of 
inherited alliances. Moreover, we found indications that these advantages are likely 
to be most outspoken in case of explorative inherited alliances. Our quantitative 
analyses provide further evidence for these unexpected advantages, demonstrating 
a significant positive impact of the number of explorative inherited alliances on 
focal firms’ financial performance. 
Jointly, our study highlights the relevance and importance of moving away 
from framing alliance portfolios as collections of homegrown alliances, which is the 
dominant conceptualization in the existing alliance portfolio research, toward 
framing them as collections of both homegrown and inherited alliances. We 
contribute to the alliance portfolio research by showing that inherited alliances 
differ from homegrown alliances and that they bring along unique opportunities 
that firms with alliance portfolios exclusively consisting of homegrown alliances 
are not exposed to. Finally, we also add to the acquisition research by showing that 
the impact of acquisitions on firm level performance is not limited to direct effects 
but also to indirect effects via inherited alliances.   
2.2. EXPLORING THE ROLE AND PERFORMANCE 
IMPLICATIONS OF INHERITED ALLIANCES 
To explore the phenomenon of inherited alliances we chose the biotechnology 
industry as both alliances and acquisitions are well represented in this particular 
context (e.g., Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). In the time period 2016-2017, we 
conducted interviews with 12 senior-level executives (e,g, CEO, Vice President of 
Corporate Development, Head of Alliance Management, Director M&As, Chief 
Scientific Officer) from biotech firms which were involved in strategic alliances and 
had recently acquired at least one firm that was engaged in strategic alliances at the 
moment of the acquisition. We performed the interviews in English, German and 
Dutch, depending on the mother tongue of our informant, providing them 
maximum comfort when expressing their thoughts and opinions (Tsang, 1998), 
which in turn also allowed us to increase the internal validity of the study (Van 
Aken, Berends, & Van der Bij, 2012). We developed a semi-structured interview 
protocol, asking informants to (i) describe the acquisition process at their firms, 
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(ii) delineate the portfolio of inherited alliances of their firm, (iii) juxtapose the 
management of inherited alliances with the management of homegrown alliances, 
and (iv) reflect on the implications of the identified differences between the two 
types of alliances. Below, we discuss the core insights that emerged out of these 
interviews and connect them to extant alliance research. First, we delve deeper into 
the nature of inherited alliances. Next, we describe the core challenges of inherited 
alliances as identified by our interviewees. Subsequently, we also discuss the 
potential opportunities that alliances can bring along.     
2.2.1. Nature of Inherited Alliances 
When a firm pursues an acquisition of a target that is engaged in strategic alliances, 
it inherits these alliances. We define such alliances as inherited alliances. 
According to interviewees, the core characteristic of inherited alliances is that they 
are pre-existing, meaning that the acquiring firm becomes co-owner of a 
partnership which it did not select, negotiate and structure itself. Extant alliance 
literature (e.g., Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2009; Reuer & Ariño, 
2007) emphasizes the importance of the initial formation stage of alliances. At this 
stage, the formal governance structure of the alliance is negotiated, implying 
important decisions such as the ownership structure, complexity of the contract, 
and composition of board and steering committees. Apart from these formal issues, 
actors involved in the formation stage of an alliance also engage in relationship 
building, implying the evaluation of the trustworthiness of the partner and 
establishing inter-firm routines (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). These formal 
decisions and informal processes, which are established at the initial stages of the 
alliance, tend of have a long-lasting impact on the success of the alliance as they 
influence partners’ ability to jointly create value, engage in behavioral learning 
processes, and mitigate opportunistic action. In contrast to this setting of 
homegrown alliances, inherited alliances imply that the acquiring firm inherits a 
pre-designed alliance, where managers of the acquiring firm have not been 




“Typically when you are negotiating with another company to form an 
alliance it can take a year or more. (…) Meanwhile, you have time to do 
your [alliance] due diligence and figure out how you will work together, 
how to put all terms together. But when you do an acquisition then all of 
a sudden that company belongs to you and then all the alliances that they 
have become your alliances. (…) It happens kind of quickly and therefore 
it is challenging.”  
 In terms of dealing with alliances of an acquired target, interviewees 
stressed that it is very difficult to terminate such alliances before the finalization of 
the acquisition deal. If an acquisition deal would not materialize and target firms 
would prematurely discontinue their alliances, it could harm their business 
significantly. As reported by one of the interviewees, “the target firm has no interest 
in terminating its own partnerships before the deal is signed and approved. It 
would be against its own interest and it would potentially destroy its business.” This 
indicates that, most of the time, executing an acquisition implies that the acquiring 
firm does not only become owner of the target, but also inherits the alliances of this 
latter actor.  
 Different interviewees provided a rather similar description of how 
acquiring firms tend to manage inherited alliances after the acquisition deal is 
completed. Typically, the focus of attention of the acquiring firm is on dealing with 
the acquired firm and its core business. Only when integration activities regarding 
the target’s core business are finalized, acquirers start looking at the inherited 
alliances. At this stage, the acquired firm typically conducts an assessment of the 
inherited alliances in order to decide whether or not to continue them and under 
which conditions:  
“You want to do your due diligence before terminating them [inherited 
alliances]. So you’ll wait until you have actually done the acquisition and 
then you look into these alliances (…) and decide what you want to and 
can do with those alliances.”  
“Once the acquisition deal is completed, our designated employees will 
perform an in-depth assessment of these partnerships. The company that 
you acquire will of course tell you that all these partnerships are high 
potentials. But that’s something we look into once the acquisition is done, 
once we have all documentation on the table.” 
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At the same time, interviewees emphasized that the alliances of the target 
firm do not tend to be a primary motivation to pursue an acquisition. Instead, 
acquiring a target firm to get access to its alliance partners was described as a 
“largely cost inefficient” strategy. Instead, interviewees clearly framed inherited 
alliances as by-products rather than a decisive factor in an acquisition. This implies 
that, when an acquisition brings along the inheritance of alliances, the alliance 
portfolio of the focal firm experience an unexpected change in composition. Prior 
alliance portfolio research tends to assume that the composition of the alliance 
portfolio is a well-considered strategic issue. In particular, it is argued that, when 
a focal firm thinks about engaging in new alliances, it will not only consider the 
value implications of this single alliance, but it will also take into account potential 
facilitating and constraining interdependencies with other alliances in the portfolio 
(e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; Parise & Casher, 2003; Wuyts & Dutta, 2014). The input of 
the interviewees indicates that inherited alliances do not really fit within this extant 
theorizing. Whereas alliance portfolio scholars refer to changes in the composition 
of the portfolio as an intentional strategy, which is the outcome of a well-thought 
decision, inherited alliances tend to represents a punctuated change in the 
portfolio, which was not intentional, but rather the by-products of another strategic 
decision (i.e., engagement in an acquisition).  
 Based on these insights, we conceptualize inherited alliances as a particular 
type of strategic partnership, which has unique attributes, i.e., pre-designed and 
unintentional, making them remarkably different from homegrown alliances.  
2.2.2. Challenges of Inherited Alliances 
Describing the challenge of managing inherited alliances, interviewees stressed 
that, looking from the perspective of the acquiring firm, this phenomenon triggers 
high information processing needs. From a technological perspective, interviewees 
pointed to the fact that, as a mutual history of collaboration is lacking, the 
technological distance between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance 
partner is likely to be higher than the technological distance between the acquired 
firm and the acquiring partner. As a result, members of the acquiring firm might 
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have difficulties to understand the true nature of the core technological alliance 
activities: 
“We [the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner] don’t have 
mutual history. Often inherited partnerships are based on a different kind 
of chemistry, another type of molecules which demand different 
capabilities, different type of chemistry that may not be understood that 
well by us.”  
Interviewees further stated that, as the acquiring firm has not initiated the 
alliance, it is difficult for members of the acquiring firm to conduct an accurate 
assessment of the risk profile of such alliances. This implies that the acquiring firm 
faces substantial information needs regarding the actual value creation potential of 
the alliance and the resource needs it encompasses:    
“We have difficulties with estimating the risk profile of such inherited 
alliances properly. With own [alliance] projects we can do it very well.”  
“If you are acquiring projects [=alliances], it is going to add to your 
budget. The problem is that you don’t know exactly how much because 
you didn’t start them.”  
Whereas the event of acquiring alliances triggers high information 
processing needs at the acquiring firm, it is also likely to simultaneously create an 
information processing capacity problem for the acquiring firm. Interviewees 
described that, for members of the acquiring firm, managing inherited alliances is 
a very stressful activity, where cognitively overloading—a state in which the 
receiver is oversupplied with information or tasks simultaneously (Kirsh, 2000: 
23)—is likely to emerge. Managers at the acquiring firm that deal with inherited 
alliances are likely to face numerous question marks that need to be addressed 
simultaneously and often in a short period of time. In one of the presentations, 
which one of our interviewees was willing to share, he stated that personnel 
dedicated to the post-acquisition management of inherited alliances experiences 
“stress” and feels “overwhelmed”. This is caused by the “high uncertainty, low 
predictability and overburden” that come along the inherited projects as well as 
rather stiff communication patterns. The following quote gives an additional 
illustration of the capacity-consuming nature of inherited alliances and the 
emotional challenges it entails: 
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“Let’s take the analogy of pealing an onion. Often every layer you get 
down there, there are more issues and some of them will be troublesome. 
For instance, there might be things that are coming up in one of the 
acquired alliances, critical ones, and you have to deal with it suddenly 
and it’s nerve-racking because you don’t know the background. You have 
to puzzle a bit to get a clear picture of what’s going on in such an acquired 
partnership.”  
In sum, managers of the acquiring firm face high information processing 
needs to get a better understanding of the technological activities, the risk profile 
of the alliance and its resource needs. At the same time, cognitive overload is likely 
to be present which restricts the actual ability to process new information. We 
therefore expect that, in comparison with homegrown alliances, inherited alliances 
imply a higher risk of information processing gaps (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Prior 
alliance portfolio research (e.g., Deeds & Hill, 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; 
Bos et al., 2017) already pointed to the performance risks of such information 
processing gaps for large portfolios of homegrown alliances. In particular, they 
argue that, when the managers of the focal firm face a situation where alliance-
related information processing capacities are lower than information processing 
needs, partner firms can opportunistically exploit this situation, leading to 
unintended knowledge spillovers and additional costs. In addition, such a situation 
might increase the vulnerability of the focal firm to (i) reputation damage because 
of unexpected actions of alliance partners (Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2010) and (ii) 
conflicts of interest across alliances in the portfolio (Parise & Casher, 2003), which 
have negative financial performance implications. As the risk of information 
processing gaps is even more outspoken for inherited alliances, we expect that, 
when acquiring firms inherit several alliances because of an acquisition, such 
increase in inherited alliances can bring along negative performance implications 
for the focal firm. 
According to the interviewees, inherited alliances not only imply 
challenges for the managers of the acquiring firm, but also trigger problems for the 
alliance itself. In the extant alliance literature (de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Chung 
& Beamish 2010; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 2014), it is argued that 
unexpected changes in the composition and structure of alliances can have 
disruptive implications for the alliance. For instance, replacing people in alliances 
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can disrupt established psychological contracts, trustful relationships and inter-
firm routines (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). In a similar vein, our interviewees argued 
that, when an alliance experience a change in ownership because one partner gets 
acquired by another firm, this change is likely to be experienced as a relational 
distortion. Interviewees stressed that, when they inherit an alliance through an 
acquisition, this alliance is likely to experience some changes in terms of people 
and procedures:   
“Often these inherited collaborations have to be restructured to certain 
extent, some people responsible for the project are exchanged, and we put 
then new people into their roles.”  
 “I remember we had cases where the composition of teams in these 
inherited collaborative projects changed dramatically.”  
Moreover, they acknowledged that this kind of changes are typically 
experienced as being disruptive to the alliance:  
“If you have a partnership with a company and everything is going well 
and all of a sudden another firm comes in and takes over your partner. 
Well, now you don’t know what to expect. Everything was going well, you 
were aligned on strategy and all of a sudden you have to work with 
another company. So there is a period of confusion, you don’t know who 
you are going to be working with or whether there will be any change of 
direction.” 
Alliance research (e.g., Bakker, 2016) has provided indications that 
unexpected post-formation alliance changes increase the risk of unplanned alliance 
termination, having negative financial implications for the involved firms. 
Following this line of reasoning, it can be expected that an increased number of 
inherited alliance negatively influence the financial performance of the focal firm. 
Interviewees also suggested that the negative effect of such distortions is likely to 
be more outspoken for marketing and manufacturing alliances than for R&D 
alliances.  
“The worst are the marketing-related or manufacturing partnerships. 
Slowdowns here are not really acceptable. These collaborations have to 
stay in motion. You need to consider the geography-, finance- and 
regulation-related aspects, and act – commercialize, manufacture. It’s 
complicated and complex. If we slowdown for few weeks or a couple of 
months in research and development, that’s something that people are 
willing to accept, you sort of gain some time to, for example, learn about 
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applied chemistry. But the near-term obligations, they can be really 
troublesome.”  
 
Relying on extant alliance typologies (Rothaermel, 2001; Rowley, Behrens, 
& Krackhardt, 2000; Yamakawa, Yang, & Lin, 2011), this means that the negative 
performance implications can be expected to be larger for exploitative than 
explorative alliances. 
2.2.3. Opportunities of Inherited Alliances 
Whereas interviewees pointed to important challenges of inherited alliances, they 
also pointed to potential opportunities associated to this kind of alliances. In their 
seminal paper, Ahuja and Lampert (2001: 528) already identified alliances as a 
potential strategy to address the propinquity trap—firms’ propensity to search for 
solutions in the neighborhood of existing solutions. Our interviewees suggested 
that the particular phenomenon of inherited alliances can be especially valuable in 
this respect. In particular, it was stressed that, in case of an inherited alliance, the 
partner firm is more likely to have problem-solving routines and procedures that 
are more distant from the acquiring firm. Whereas such different routines are likely 
to be experienced as disruptive in exploitative alliances such as marketing and 
manufacturing alliances, they can actually be beneficial for more explorative 
settings. One interviewee, for instance, explained:  
“You develop your expertise through working on these more distant 
projects [in inherited alliances]…. we can learn and further implement 
how things are done…we learn whether and how particular elements 
work together… we learn how to approach certain issues, what can or not 
be combined with each other.”  
We therefore expect that, when inherited alliances are of an explorative 
nature, they can actually help the acquiring firm in addressing propinquity traps.  
In the strategy literature, the importance of dynamic capabilities – i.e., "the 
firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences 
to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) has 
been emphasized. In our interviews, it was suggested that dealing with inherited 
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alliances can actually be a stimulating factor, increasing the ability of the acquiring 
firm to deal with the need to flexibly adjust:  
“With our [homegrown alliance] partners, we have our ways but here 
[i.e., inherited alliances] the relations are a bit fragile because our 
company enters a partnership when it’s already operational and some 
changes will have to be made. But it’s actually a good exercise for us. It 
sort of pushes us to embrace some uncertainty by working in conditions 
where change is required. You sort of have to be flexible but stay sharp to 
keep things going in the right direction.”  
In other words, engaging in inherited alliances may help acquiring firms to 
become better in flexibly dealing with unanticipated changes, reflecting stronger 
dynamic capabilities. 
In sum, we conclude that inherited alliances trigger both challenges and 
capability building opportunities that homegrown alliances do not bring along. 
Moreover, we found indications that the salience of these challenges and 
opportunities might be different for inherited alliances of a more exploitative or 
explorative nature.  
2.3. METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. Data and Sample 
In order to quantitatively explore the insights from the qualitative study, we 
collected data for a sample of biotechnology firms. As indicated in the interviews 
and as observed in existing literature (Hagedoorn & Wang, 2012; Hagedoorn & 
Duysters, 2002), firms in the biotechnology industry often rely on inter-firm 
collaboration and acquisitions to acquire external knowledge and therefore this 
industry constitutes a suitable empirical context to explore the phenomena of 
inherited alliances. We used a list of top biotechnology firms (ranked by their 2004 
revenue) constructed by the MedAdNews (a leading biopharma industry’s 
magazine that since 1982 provides news coverage about events, trends and 
strategies in biopharmaceutical industry) to identify the top 50 firms in the 
industry. From this group of firms, only 39 had complete information available so 
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our final sample consists of 418 firm-year observations across the period between 
1996 and 2010. 
In order to explore the effect of inherited alliances on firm performance we 
needed to collect detailed information about the acquisition and alliance activity of 
firms. To attain this objective, we implemented a step-by-step data collection 
procedure following the state-of-art alliance portfolio research (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; 
Asgari et al., 2017; Bos et al., 2017). We started by collecting information regarding 
acquisitions using the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database and complemented it 
with data obtained from firms’ annual and acquisition reports. In order to obtain 
detailed information about firms’ alliance activities we used LexisNexis2. 
LexisNexis is a database that provides access to archival press releases from 
thousands of firms from all over the world. It includes articles in English and 
English translations of articles originally published in other mainstream languages. 
In order to identify the alliance portfolios of the firms included in our 
sample, we developed an algorithm that searched for specific terms, like firm 
name, industry and synonyms of collaboration activities, and that considered the 
proximity between the terms in the press releases. We were able to identify 
approximately 70,000 articles with relevant information about the firms in our 
sample. The information in the press releases allowed the identification of both 
homegrown alliances and inherited alliances, i.e., alliances that firms that were 
acquired by firms in our sample had at the moment of the acquisition. 
The correct identification of alliance portfolios implies the determination 
of the life span of each alliance. In order to determine the ending dates of 
homegrown alliances we used press releases3 and annual reports. For those 
alliances for which we did not find an exact termination date, we followed the 
                                                 
2 Previous research argues that alliance data obtained from press releases available in databases like 
LexisNexis and Factiva provide more complete information regarding alliance agreements than 
databases that provide readily coded alliances data such as SDC Platinum Alliances and JVs (e.g. Lavie, 
2007; Asgari et al., 2017). To attest this, we collected information on the alliance agreements of several 
firms from our sample using the SDC Alliances and JVs database and compared the results with the 
portfolio that we identified with the data from the LexisNexis database. This comparison showed that 
the SDC Alliance and JVs database only included 20% of alliances identified in LexisNexis and that the 
SDC Alliances and JVs database does not include alliances that are not identifiable in the press releases 
available in LexisNexis. 
 
3 Besides allowing for a more complete identification of firms’ portfolios, LexisNexis also includes more 
thorough information on the starting and ending dates of the alliances than the SDC Alliances and JVs 
database that only provides data on the starting dates. 
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approach of Ahuja (2000). Namely, we assumed that an alliance continued until 
the last year in which it was mentioned or until the year after the year in which it 
was formed. Regarding the inherited alliances, we gathered information on 
alliances from the acquired firm that were active at the moment of acquisition and 
traced them in a similar way as the homegrown alliances. As a last step, we 
complemented the identification of alliances and acquisitions with information 
from annual reports, 10-K and 20-F filings of the focal firms, acquired firms and 
inherited alliance partners. 
Our procedure led to the identification of 1750 homegrown and 232 
inherited alliances involving the firms in our sample during the period 1996-2010. 
These numbers give an indication of the relevance of inherited alliances since, on 
average, they constitute eight percent of all alliances in an alliance portfolio in a 
particular year. In order to verify the reliability and validity of our approach, we 
asked our interviewees to assess the list of homegrown and inherited alliances that 
we identified using our search method. The interviewees confirmed that we were 
able to capture a very accurate picture of their alliance portfolios, both homegrown 
and inherited. After we have identified all alliances, we used Orbis database, annual 
reports, 10-K and 20-F filings to collect general information about the firms in our 
sample and their alliance partners. 
2.3.2. Measures 
Dependent Variable  
In line with existing alliance research (Bos et al., 2017; Faems, De Visser, 
Andries, & Van Looy, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010), we measure focal firms’ 
performance using net profit margin (ratio of net profit (loss) to revenue). In our 
estimation, the net profit margin is measured in t+1 while all explanatory variables 
are measured in time t. We chose a financial indicator as a measure of firm 
performance since an innovation indicator would only provide a partial picture of 
the effect of the different types of alliances (R&D, commercialization, 





In order to investigate the effect of inherited alliances on firm performance 
we needed to build different alliance portfolio variables. In line with alliance 
portfolio research (e.g., Bos et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2010), we measure the number 
of homegrown alliances with the cumulative number of all alliances that were 
formed by the focal firm and that are active in a given year. Analogously, we 
operationalize the number of inherited alliances as the sum of all alliances that 
were inherited by the focal firm via acquisitions and that are active in a given year. 
The number of all alliances is the sum of all homegrown and inherited alliances. 
The qualitative study gave us indications that the nature (explorative or 
exploitative) of an acquire alliance influences the impact that this type of alliances 
have on performance. Accordingly, we constructed variables differentiating 
explorative and explorative alliance portfolios. The number of homegrown 
explorative alliances is the sum of all active self-initiated alliances focused on R&D 
activities (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Yamakawa et al., 2011). We measure the number of 
homegrown exploitative alliances as the sum of all active self-initiated alliances 
focused on non-R&D activities, like commercialization, distribution and 
manufacturing (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Yamakawa et al., 2011). We followed a similar 
procedure concerning the inherited alliances and construct the variables number 
of inherited explorative and number of inherited exploitative alliances. 
Control Variables 
We control for several firm- and portfolio-level dimensions that may influence firm 
financial performance. Following previous research (e.g., Bos et al., 2017, Lahiri & 
Narayanan, 2013) we control for firm size (number of employees, log-
transformed). We also include a variable measuring R&D intensity, i.e., the ratio 
of R&D expenditures to total sales, log-transformed (Bos et al., 2017) since we 
expect financial performance to be influenced by a firm’s investment in the creation 
of knowledge. Acquisitions often imply considerable organizational changes and 
have impact on firm performance (Longhran & Vijh, 1997; Riviezzo, 2013). To 
control for the direct effect of the acquisition activity of a firm on its performance, 
we included the number of pursued acquisitions (in t0). We also control for alliance 
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portfolio attributes that may have an effect on firm performance. Following Jiang 
et al. (2010), we control for the industrial diversity (Blau index based on the shares 
of different SIC codes categorized by the level of similarity of the industry affiliation 
at the 4-digits level) and functional diversity (Blau index based on the shares of 
R&D, commercialization, distribution, manufacturing and other alliances) of the 
alliance portfolio. For both diversity scores we included homegrown and inherited 
alliances.  
2.3.4. Estimation Approach 
The main objective of our quantitative analysis is to investigate if changes in a 
firm’s portfolio of inherited alliances have an effect on its financial performance. 
In order to capture this within-firm variation we use fixed-effects OLS regression 
models4. The use of fixed-effects models reduces potential reverse causality and 
ensures that the results are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity (Veerbek, 
2012). In order to address potential endogeneity concerns, we use a one year time-
lag between our dependent and independent variables.  
2.4. RESULTS 
Table 2.1. provides descriptive statistics that allow for the characterization of the 
average firm in our sample. The average firm has 1463 employees and invests 162 
% of its sales in R&D activities. Moreover, it has a portfolio of 14.5 alliances from 
which 13 are homegrown alliances and 1.5 are inherited alliances. What is more, 
the number of explorative alliances (homegrown = 9.1; inherited = 1.3) in firm’s 
portfolios is on average larger than the number of exploitative alliances 




                                                 
4 The Hausman test showed no systematic differences between the fixed and random effects models 
(χ2=29.90, p=0.152). However, the fixed-effects regression results show that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is correlated to observed regressors (ρ=0.142). This gives an indication that the fixed-




Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics     
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Net profit margin (t+1)  -0.74 1.37 -5.27 0.50 
Number of alliances  
(Total portfolio) 
14.50 10.76 1.00 55.00 
No. of homegrown alliances 12.98 9.16 1.00 49.00 
No. of inherited alliances 1.52 3.23 0.00 25.00 
Number of explorative inherited alliances 1.25 2.82 0.00 24.00 
Number of exploitative inherited alliances 0.28 0.67 0.00 5.00 
Number of explorative homegrown alliances 9.12 7.32 0.00 42.00 
Number of exploitative homegrown alliances 3.86 4.28 0.00 25.00 
Industrial diversity 
(Total portfolio) 
0.48 0.20 0.00 0.81 
Functional diversity 
(Total portfolio) 
0.59 0.15 0.00 0.82 
Number of pursued acquisitions 0.20 0.49 0.00 3.00 
R&D intensity   1.62 5.34 0.00 78.88 
Firm size  1,463.05 2,948.24 6.00 20,100.00 
Note. Number of firms=39; Number of observations=418 
 
Table 2.2. provides correlation coefficients for all independent variables5. 
The correlation values do not give any indication of the existence of 
multicollinearity problems. Moreover, the average (1.54) and maximum (2.15) 
variance inflation factor values are well below the common multicollinearity 
thresholds of 5 and 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken., 2003; Kleinbaum, Kupper, 






                                                 
5 In Table 2.2. we present the correlations for all variables that we have used in our final model, i.e., 
Model 5. We calculated the correlations for variables used in Models 1-4 and could conclude that no 
multicollinearity issues exist.  
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Table 2.2. Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Net profit margin (t+1)  1.00 
         
Number of explorative 
inherited alliances  
0.19 1.00 
        
Number of exploitative 
inherited alliances  
0.17 0.54 1.00 
       
Number of explorative 
homegrown alliances  
0.07 0.30 0.33 1.00 
      
Number of exploitative 
homegrown alliances  
0.24 0.16 0.35 0.19 1.00 
     
Industrial diversity               
(Total portfolio) 
-0.02 0.20 0.17 0.38 0.10 1.00 
    
Functional diversity                      
(Total portfolio) 
0.13 -0.01 0.15 -0.05 0.45 -0.00 1.00 
   
Number of pursued 
acquisitions  
0.13 0.44 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.03 1.00 
  
R&D intensity (ln)  -0.60 -0.14 -0.20 -0.09 -0.37 0.03 -0.26 -0.15 1.00 
 
Firm size (ln) 0.26 0.42 0.48 0.57 0.41 0.32 0.20 0.33 -0.34 1.00 
 Note. Number of firms=39; Number of observations=418; Mean VIF=1.54;  Highest VIF for firm size = 2.15 
Table 2.3. presents the results of the fixed-effects regression models on 
firm financial performance. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes the control 
variables and the variable measuring the total number of alliances. Models 2 and 3 
include the number of homegrown alliances and the number of inherited alliances, 
respectively. Model 4 includes these two variables simultaneously and allows us to 
analyze the effect of homegrown and inherited alliances on firm performance. 






Table 2.3. Fixed effects regression results (Dependent variable: net profit margin (t+1)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 














































































































































Number of observations 418 418 418 418 418 
Number of firms 39 39 39 39 39 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.171 0.175 0.184 0.189 0.192 
Note. Fixed effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. The significance level is indicates as follows: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions include a full set of year dummies, which are not reported for 
brevity.  
The results from Model 1 show that an increase in the size of the alliance 
portfolio of firm does not significantly affect its performance. However, when we 
distinguish between homegrown and inherited alliances (Model 2-4), we observe 
that changes in the number of the two types of alliances exhibit different 
performance implications. Namely, we find that an increase in the number of 
homegrown alliances does not significantly influence firm financial performance 
positively or negatively. However, we find that an increase in the number of 




The results from Model 5 show that the effect of alliances also depends on 
their nature. In particular, we find a surprising and interesting contrast between 
homegrown and inherited alliances. While an increase in the number of explorative 
inherited alliances leads to a performance increase, an increase in the number of 
explorative homegrown alliances has a negative effect on firm performance (both 
statistically significant). The results for the exploitative alliances variables are both 
non-significant. With respect to our control variables, it is worth mentioning that 
we did not find a significant direct effect of pursued acquisition on firm 
performance. The other control variables show consistent results across all models.  
To check the robustness of the results (Table 2.4.), we used net profit 
















Table 2.4. Fixed effects regression results (Dependent variable: net profit margin (t+2)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 














































































































































Number of observations 399 399 399 399 399 
Number of firms 39 39 39 39 39 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.086 0.108 0.089 0.121 0.139 
Note. Fixed effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. The significance level is indicates as 
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions include a full set of year dummies, which are not 
reported for brevity. The decrease in the number of observations is due to the fact that for some of the cases 





2.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Relying on both qualitative and quantitative data, this paper explores the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances. Based on our interviews, we concluded that 
inherited alliances are clearly different from homegrown alliances, implying 
particular managerial challenges as well as capability building opportunities. Our 
quantitative analyses provided confirmation for the unique nature of inherited 
alliances, demonstrating that changes in the number of inherited alliances have a 
different impact on financial performance than changes in the number of 
homegrown alliances. Below, we discuss the implications of these findings for both 
alliance portfolio and acquisition research. Subsequently, we point to the core 
limitations of our research and suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
2.5.1. Implications for Alliance Portfolio Research 
Some scholars (e.g., Wassmer, 2010) have highlighted a need for a more fine-
grained conceptualization of alliance portfolios to better capture their complexity. 
In this paper, we address this call by making an explicit distinction between 
homegrown alliances and inherited alliances. In this way, we challenge the implicit 
assumption of the majority of extant alliance portfolio research (e.g., Jiang et al., 
2010; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013; Lavie, 2007) that focal firms initiate all the 
alliances that constitute their portfolio. Instead, we point to the possibility that 
focal firms inherit alliances by means of acquisitions. Our quantitative results 
clearly highlight the importance of this distinction, illuminating different 
performance implications for changes in the number of inherited and homegrown 
alliances. These differences are most prominent for explorative alliances. We see a 
significant negative impact of an increase in the number of homegrown explorative 
alliances on financial performance. Given the operationalization of our dependent 
variable (i.e., net profit margin in t+1), this result is not surprising. The temporal 
distance between making investments in exploring a new technology and 
generating financial results tends to be quite extensive, especially in high-tech 
settings such as biotechnology. In this way, it is not surprising that, when a focal 
firm initiates additional explorative alliances, this mainly implies additional costs 
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in the short-term, whereas the financial benefits will only manifest in the longer 
term. 
 The more surprising result is that we find a significant positive impact of 
the number of inherited alliances on financial performance. A first explanation for 
this result might be that, on average, such inherited explorative alliances are likely 
to be in existence for a longer time (i.e., they have been initiated in the past by the 
acquired firm). As a result, there is the possibility that, whereas most costly 
investments have been made in the past (i.e., before the acquiring firm became 
owner of this alliances), the financial benefits are starting to emerge when the 
acquiring firm inherits this alliance. In other words, inherited explorative alliances 
might represent a phenomenon where costly investments have been made by 
others in the past, whereas the new owner can reap its financial benefits. The 
positive impact of an increase in the number of inherited alliances on financial 
performance also suggest that the capability building opportunities of explorative 
inherited alliances, which were identified by our interviewees, outweigh their 
managerial challenges.   
Together, our findings point to the importance of explicitly considering the 
phenomenon of inherited alliances in future alliance portfolio research. It needs to 
be stressed that, in comparison with the current state-of-the-art in operationalizing 
alliance portfolios, this implies additional methodological challenges. First, 
considering inherited alliances requires that scholars do not only need to map the 
alliance activities of the focal firm, but also to map the alliance activities of firms 
that have been acquired by the focal firm. Extant databases (e.g., Recap, MERIT-
CATI, SDC Platinum), which have been extensively used in alliance portfolio 
research (Schilling, 2009), tend to provide in-depth information on the alliances 
activities of parent firms and their subsidiaries. However, they do not provide 
information on the past alliance activities of acquired firms. Identifying potential 
inherited alliances therefore not only asks for mapping all alliance activities of the 
focal firm, but also all alliance activities of firms or entities that have been inherited 
by this firm.  Second, it is important to empirically capture whether alliances of 
acquired firms really enter the portfolio of the acquiring firm at the time of 
acquisition and how long they remain active post-acquisition. Whereas alliance 
portfolio research has typically relied on fixed time windows, assuming that 
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alliances stay operational for a particular number of years, some scholars (e.g., 
Asgari et al., 2017) have started to develop more fine-grained procedure to 
operationalize the longevity of alliances. Further building on these recent 
developments, we have developed a particular protocol to identify inherited 
alliances and determine their duration. We hope that these methodological 
guidelines can help scholars in further optimizing their operationalization of 
alliance portfolios, capturing both homegrown and inherited ones.    
2.5.2. Implications for Acquisition Research  
Our findings also have implications for extant acquisition research. Acquisition 
scholars continue struggling with the observation that, although acquisitions on 
average seem to negatively impact financial performance of firms, they remain 
highly popular (Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2017). Our paper provides a 
new perspective on this discussion, highlighting that, in case of an acquisition, the 
acquiring firm not only becomes owner of the acquired firm, but also inherits the 
external network of this latter actor.  Our analyses also indicate that inheriting the 
external network of the acquired firm can have significant performance 
implications beyond and above the impact of the acquisition itself. For instance, it 
is interesting to notice that, when entering the variable number of inherited 
alliances in our models, the sign of coefficient of number of acquisitions changes 
(see Model 3 in Table 2.3.). These observations seem to indicate that to adequately 
evaluate the performance implications of acquisitions, it is important to move away 
from an atomistic perspective on acquisitions, explicitly acknowledging that 
acquired firms are embedded in a broader network, which might have important 
performance implications for the acquiring firm.  
2.5.3. Practitioner Implications 
These findings are not only relevant for academic scholars, but also have important 
practitioner implications. For alliance managers, these findings indicate that, when 
managing and monitoring alliance portfolios, it is not only important to consider 
alliances that are initiated by focal firm itself, but also the ones that enter the 
alliance portfolio by means of an acquisition. Especially in the setting of large 
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multinational organizations, getting an adequate overview of the full alliance 
portfolio, including the set of inherited alliances, might be a challenging but 
important task. If alliance managers would ignore inherited alliances, they might 
miss out potential synergies across different alliances as well as underestimate the 
existence of constraining interdependencies between them.   
In terms of acquisition management, our findings also suggest that, when 
firms consider an acquisition, they should not only consider the resources, risks, 
and potential synergies of the target firm, but should also take into account its 
alliance partners. At the same time, our interviewees seemed to indicate that, pre-
acquisition, limited attention is paid to the alliance partners of target firms. 
Instead, they are merely seen as a by-product of an acquisition, which has to be 
dealt with after the acquisition-dust has settled.  
2.5.4. Limitations and Future Research 
This research has several limitations, which open up the avenue for the future 
research. First, as we focus on one particular industry, the generalizability of our 
findings to other sectors is questionable. We therefore encourage future research 
to study the phenomenon of inherited alliances in other settings. 
Another limitation is our focus on financial performance as the dependent 
variable. Focusing on this particular variable, we were able to identify a positive 
effect of inherited alliance that was mainly due to explorative ones. At the same 
time, we acknowledge that the translation of alliance activities in financial 
performance is rather complex. We therefore encourage future research to consider 
alternative dependent variables that allow evaluating the impact of inherited 
alliances on value creation and value appropriation more directly. 
 Although our interviews provided quite a consistent picture of how biotech 
firms manage inherited alliances, we expect that more variety can be present in 
how this phenomenon is addressed. For instance, whereas our interviews provided 
a rather reactive view on how inherited alliances are addressed, we would expect 
that, in other contexts, acquiring firms might apply a more proactive approach. We 
also see interesting opportunities to further explore the interdependencies between 
acquiring firms’ post-acquisition integration approach (i.e., preservation versus 
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absorption strategy) and how inherited alliances are managed. Such research 
endeavors could further improve our understanding of the challenges and 
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Whereas prior research has acknowledged that, in dyadic alliances, one partner can 
acquire the other, it ignored the possibility of one partner being acquired by 
another company that was not involved in the alliance. We define alliances, which 
experience the acquisition of one partner by a third company, as inherited 
alliances. We posit that inherited alliances bring along unique information 
asymmetry and coordination challenges for the acquiring firm, jeopardizing the 
stability of inherited alliances. At the same time, we expect that acquired alliance 
partners can help acquiring firms to navigate these challenges, increasing the 
resilience of inherited alliances. Using a sample of inherited alliances from the 
biotech sector, we find that pre-acquisition duration of the inherited alliance and 
the presence of a post-acquisition preservation strategy increase the resilience of 
inherited alliances. Jointly, our findings contribute to the post-formation alliance 
literature, exploring a compositional alliance change that has been largely ignored. 
In addition, our findings have implications for the acquisition literature, indicating 
that the choice for a particular integration strategy has implications that go beyond 
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Firms form strategic alliances, which we define as “independently initiated 
exchange, sharing, or co-development agreements” (Gulati, 1995, p.86), in order to 
complement their internal resource needs. As post-formation alliance literature 
highlights, alliances are not static entities. Instead, they are dynamic phenomena, 
undergoing changes throughout their lifecycle. Next to shifts in equity distribution 
between alliance partners (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Iriyama & Madhavan, 2014), 
changes in board composition, and contractual changes (e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, & 
Mayer, 2007; Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002), scholars 
identified changes in post-formation partnership configuration as core sources of 
alliance instability. In particular, they considered the exit, replacement and entry 
of partners in alliances as important configurational partner changes (e.g., Bakker, 
2016; Lavie & Singh, 2011).  
In this paper, we point to another mode of configurational partner change, 
which has been largely ignored: the acquisition of an alliance partner by a third 
company. Whereas prior research has acknowledged the possibility that firms can 
be acquired by one of their alliance partners (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004; Zaheer, 
Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010), it has not considered the possibility of one alliance 
partner being acquired by another company. This is surprising since this latter 
phenomenon, which we define as inherited alliances, is not a rare event. For 
example, in the biopharma industry, an acquisition of one of the partners by a third 
company occurs in 10% of all alliances (see Asgari, Singh, & Mitchell, 2017; 
Oleksiak, Faems, & de Faria, 2017). This particular type of post-formation change 
is theoretically different from other configurational partner changes. This 
theoretical uniqueness comes from the fact that an acquisition of an alliance 
partner by a third firm implies that the acquiring firm formally replaces the 
acquired firm as the partner in the alliance, but the resources of the acquired 
alliance partner remain present within the alliance. In other words, even though a 
new firm (the acquirer) becomes the legally responsible party in the alliance, the 
acquired alliance partner still plays a role in the alliance and it can play a role in 
attenuating the level of disruption that coincides with the acquisition of one of the 
alliance partners.  
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The core objective of this study is to explore the resilience of inherited 
alliances. We define alliance resilience as the ability to continuously achieve 
desirable outcomes amidst adversity, strain and significant barriers to adaptation 
or development (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p.34). Relying on insights from 
information economics and post-formation alliance literature, we identify two core 
challenges that jeopardize the resilience of inherited alliances: high information 
asymmetry between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner, i.e., the 
alliance partner of the acquired firm that the acquiring firm inherits in the 
acquisition, and coordination disruptions. We focus on the role of the acquired firm 
as navigator in addressing these challenges. In particular, we expect that the 
acquired alliance partner can mitigate the challenges associated with information 
asymmetry and coordination disruptions by acting as a knowledge broker and a 
relational mediator. We identify particular conditions––technological relatedness 
between the acquired firm and inherited alliance partner and history of joint 
collaboration between the acquired firm and inherited alliance partner—that shape 
the ability of the acquired firm to execute this navigating role. Based on this 
reasoning, we develop hypotheses on how these conditions influence the resilience 
of inherited alliances. Finally, relying on insights from acquisition literature (e.g., 
Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006; Puranam, Sigh, & Chaudhuri, 2009), we also 
consider the post-acquisition integration strategy and its impact on alliance 
resilience.  
We test our hypotheses with a dataset of 213 inherited alliances from 
biotechnology sector. We find that inherited alliances are more resilient if the 
acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner have a history of joint 
collaboration, and if the acquired alliance partner was preserved by the acquirer 
after the acquisition.  
This paper advances research on post-formation alliance dynamics, 
highlighting a particular mode of post-formation change—acquisition of alliance 
partner by third company—that has received limited attention in extant literature. 
Whereas such inherited alliances face particular challenges, we highlight that the 
acquired firm, acting as knowledge broker and relational mediator roles, can help 
to increase the resilience of inherited alliances. This is particularly evident in the 
positive effect of history of joint collaboration between the acquired firm and the 
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inherited alliance partner on inherited alliance’s resilience. This latter finding also 
contributes to the broader discussion on the role of partner-specific experience on 
alliance outcomes (e.g., Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). Specifically, we add a new dimension to the partner-specific 
experience construct and highlight the importance of partner-specific experience 
gained within a particular alliance. We show that the partner-specific experience 
within rather than across alliances attenuates the disruptive effects of alliance 
partner acquisition by a third firm.  Finally, our findings have implications for the 
acquisition literature (e.g., Datta, 1991; Puranam et al., 2006; Zollo & Singh, 2004), 
indicating that the choice for a particular integration strategy has implications that 
go beyond the interface between the acquired and acquiring firm. 
3.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we first discuss why an acquisition of one of the partners is likely to 
threaten the stability of an alliance. We point to both information asymmetry and 
coordination problems as important challenges in this respect. Subsequently, we 
highlight the roles of the acquired firm in navigating these challenges. We then 
hypothesize under which conditions the acquired firm is more able to execute such 
navigating roles. Finally, we point to the integration strategy as an important 
condition that influences inherited alliances’ resilience to such acquisition event. 
3.2.1. Alliance Partner Acquired by a Third Firm: Core Challenges  
We expect that, in the context of inherited alliances, the acquiring firm faces two 
important challenges. First, the acquiring firm is likely to experience information 
asymmetries, meaning that the inherited alliance partner has more information 
about the inherited alliance than the acquiring firm. Second, the acquiring firm is 
likely to face coordination problems, implying that the acquiring firm can run into 
disagreements with the inherited alliance partner regarding how to manage the 
inherited alliance after the partner acquisition.  
Challenge of information asymmetry. Firms scout for and aim to 
select partners that have and are willing to contribute with the necessary resources 
and capabilities to achieve particular goals in a joint alliance (Bierly III & Gallagher, 
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2007; Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). In the process of 
alliance formation, partners define the objectives and general conditions, which 
provide a roadmap for the joint collaboration over time (Reuer & Ariño, 2007). 
Whilst firms strive to form alliances with the best partners, the initial alliance 
composition may change over its life cycle (see Bakker, 2016; Chung & Beamish, 
2010; Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010). When such changes take place, 
the new to the alliance firm is put in an informational disadvantage and this 
threatens the overall success of the alliance (Dyer et al., 2004). 
An acquisition of an alliance partner implies that the acquiring firm is 
entering an ongoing alliance. This implies that the acquiring firm was not involved 
in the initial process of alliance negotiation and formation. In comparison with the 
inherited alliance partner, the acquiring firm is therefore likely to have less specific 
information on the goals of the alliances and the extent to which and how these 
goals are being realized6. In addition, the acquiring firm has rather limited 
knowledge of the inherited alliance partner’s resources, capabilities, and 
management approach. This information asymmetry between acquiring firm and 
inherited alliance partner can have important consequences for the alliance. 
Information economists argue that, when one actor experiences high information 
asymmetry, this actor may be hesitant to make investments (Agarwal, Taffler, 
Bellotti, & Nash, 2015; Mishra, Heide, & Cort, 1998; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Translating these insights into the context of inherited alliances, the inherited 
alliance partner has more knowledge about the alliance than the acquiring firm has. 
This implies that the acquiring firm is in a position of information disadvantage. 
This information asymmetry is likely to reduce the willingness of the acquiring firm 
to invest in the inherited alliance, which can threaten the stability and continuity 
of the inherited alliance.  
Coordination challenges. Configurational changes in alliances such as 
partner exit, replacement and addition often represent a major shake-up, 
threatening the overall stability of an alliance (Bakker, 2016; Das & Teng, 2000; 
                                                 
6 The acquiring firm also cannot obtain complete information about the alliance in the due diligence 
prior to the deal (Reuer, Shenkar, & Ragozzino, 2004) since it would not be in the interest of the 
acquisition target and its alliance partner to reveal sensitive information, for the case of an uncompleted 
transaction. Consequently, when a firm decides to acquire another firm that is involved in alliances, it 
will not have complete information about the alliances of the acquired firm. 
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Greve et al., 2010).  With respect to these compositional alliance changes, post-
formation alliance literature has identified a core coordination challenge, which is 
the disruption of alliance routines. 
It is likely that configurational changes disrupt the collaborative routines 
and patterns of interaction within an alliance. When firms cooperate towards 
achieving a common goal, they develop specific cooperative mechanisms and refine 
them further to serve the alliance tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible 
(Greve et al., 2010; Zollo et al., 2002). In the event of a configurational partner 
change in an alliance, it is likely that the established routines are disrupted (Chung 
& Beamish, 2010). In addition, the available set of skills, capabilities or tangible 
assets changes (Das & Teng, 2000), implying that the alliance needs to further 
revise its routines to work within the new status quo. Consequently, the alliance 
partner reconfiguration may divert the partners’ attention from ongoing alliance 
operations towards reorganizational efforts (Chung & Beamish, 2010). For 
instance, when a new partner enters an alliance, those that were already involved 
in the alliance have to adapt to the new situation by assigning the new partner 
adequate roles so that their alliance can continue to function (Bakker, 2016). This 
reorganization process requires substantial managerial attention and entails the 
risk of disagreements and misunderstandings, which may further challenge the 
stability and continuity of such an alliance (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002).  
We expect that, in the context of inherited alliances, similar coordination 
challenges are likely to emerge. An acquisition of one of the alliance partners by a 
firm external to the alliance implies that at least some of the alliance structures and 
routines are likely to be disrupted (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Bakker, 
2016; Chung & Beamish, 2010). In the effort of establishing new collaboration 
mechanisms, the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner may face 
conflicting views on who should be responsible for what and how the alliance 
should be managed. As such, the attention will be directed first towards resolving 
the disputes regarding the whats and hows rather than towards the execution of 
the alliance agreement, putting the realization of alliance goals in jeopardy.    
 In sum, we expect that, information asymmetry and coordination 
problems are likely to emerge when one of the alliance partners is acquired by a 
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third firm, jeopardizing the stability of the inherited alliance. Below, we point to 
the acquired firm as a potential navigator that can help to mitigate these challenges.  
3.2.2. Navigating Role of the Acquired Firm 
We expect that, in the context of inherited alliances, the acquired firm can have two 
important roles in navigating the relationship between the acquiring firm and the 
inherited alliance partner. First, it has the potential to act as a knowledge broker 
that transfers knowledge and provides knowledge linkages between the acquiring 
firm and the inherited alliance partner. Second, it can act as a relational mediator, 
helping to resolve potential conflicts between the acquiring firm and the inherited 
alliance partner.  
Acquired firm as a knowledge broker. Although the acquiring firm 
becomes the formal partner in the alliance after the acquisition, the acquired 
alliance partner does not disappear, which gives it the possibility to broker relevant 
knowledge between the acquirer and the inherited alliance partner. The acquired 
alliance partner’s understanding of the technological resources and capabilities of 
the inherited alliance partner allows it to transfer specific technical information 
about the inherited alliance to the acquiring firm (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). Over 
the course of the alliance, the acquired firm has also developed knowledge about 
how the alliance operates (Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009). The acquired firm 
can therefore transfer to the acquiring firm information on what processes are 
implemented for realizing particular alliance objectives. In sum, the acquired 
alliance partner is able to select relevant information on the inherited alliance, 
consolidate it and transfer it in an efficient way to the acquiring firm, while 
protecting the parent from information overload (Soderberg & Romani, 2017) and 
ultimately reducing information asymmetries.   
Acquired firm as a relational mediator. Being involved in the 
ongoing alliance, the acquired firm has also developed the ability to resolve 
conflicts with the inherited alliance partner (Zollo et al., 2002). Together, the 
acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner have developed processes by which 
they can reach a mutually acceptable and beneficial compromise in case of conflicts 
or disagreements (Kaplan, Norton, & Rugelsjoen, 2010; Parry, Song, & Spekman, 
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2008). These processes can be valuable in the situation when a company that was 
not involved in the alliance acquires one of the partners. This is because it is likely 
that after the acquisition of the alliance partner, the acquiring firm may want to 
reorganize the inherited alliance. The acquiring firm may request standardization 
and streamlining of alliance activities, including personnel changes and 
adjustments in communication patterns as well as refinement of alliance 
performance evaluation. This, however, may yield disagreements from the 
inherited alliance partner. In such conflict-prone situations, the acquired firm can 
mediate and help to resolve the dispute between the acquiring firm and the 
inherited alliance partner by arriving at an acceptable compromise for both of them 
(Johnson & Duxbury, 2010). Consequently, such action has the potential to relieve 
(some of) the coordination considerations of the acquiring firm.  
 While the above arguments indicate that the acquired alliance partner can 
play an important role in addressing the core challenges of managing inherited 
alliances, we expect that the ability of the acquired alliance partner to execute these 
navigating roles depends on particular conditions (i.e., technological relatedness 
between the acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner, history of joint 
collaboration between the acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner, and the 
post-acquisition integration strategy). In the next section, we develop hypotheses 
on how these conditions influence the resilience of inherited alliances. 
3.3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1. Technological Relatedness between the Acquired Firm and the 
Inherited Alliance Partner  
Technological relatedness refers to the extent to which the knowledge bases of 
alliance partners cover similar domains. Extant literature on inter-firm learning 
suggests that the relatedness of partners’ technological knowledge bases is an 
important determinant of mutual understanding of each other’s technological 
capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Firms operating in 
highly similar technological domains will be able to evaluate which resources are 
needed and how these resources should be combined for accomplishing the alliance 
goals. They will also share tacit process knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) 
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required for identification of commercial applications and transformation of such 
knowledge into new applications (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). As such, 
technologically related partners have richer and more productive information 
exchanges than partners that share less technological similarities.   
In the event of an alliance partner acquisition, having deep technological 
understanding of the inherited alliance partner’s resources and capabilities is likely 
to improve the acquired firm’s ability to broker important and relevant information 
to the acquiring firm, and consequently reduce the informational asymmetries 
between the acquirer and the inherited alliance partner. When the acquired firm 
has a deep understanding of the technological domain of its partner, it can provide 
more concise information to the acquiring firm and better protect it from 
unnecessary information overload. The acquired firm is therefore more able to 
execute the knowledge broker role as it can better explain and justify particular 
resource needs of the inherited alliance to the acquiring firm. Having clear and 
precise information about the inherited alliance’s technicalities is likely to increase 
the willingness of the acquiring firm to invest in the alliance, increasing the 
resilience of the inherited alliance. We therefore expect: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the technological relatedness between the 
acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner, the 
higher the resilience of the inherited alliance. 
3.3.2. History of Joint Collaboration between the Acquired Firm and 
Inherited Alliance Partner  
Through building joint collaboration history, alliance partners engage in a learning 
process about how to work together effectively (Grant & Baden-Fueller, 2004; 
Parkhe, 1991). They develop shared language, i.e., the understanding among 
themselves based on spoken and/or written language that helps them 
communicate more effectively and is foreign to outsiders (Koka & Prescott, 2002), 
which improves the quantity and quality of knowledge transfer (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). In the process of accumulating a history of collaboration, alliance 
partners also develop mutual trust, i.e., the mutual confidence that no party to an 
exchange will exploit another’s vulnerabilities (in Parkhe, 1991: Sabel, 1993, 
p.1133), improving alliance stability (e.g., Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 
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2006). Trust improves partners’ capacity to resolve conflicts (Kale et al., 2000) and 
to reach a mutually beneficial compromise (Zollo et al., 2002), also in periods of 
alliance instability (Lin & Germain, 1998; Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998).  
We expect that the shared language advantage present in alliances with an 
extensive joint collaboration history helps the acquired firm to navigate more 
effectively the acquiring firm’s information asymmetry challenges. Having 
developed shared language with the inherited alliance partner increases the ability 
of the acquired firm to transmit knowledge about the inherited alliance. In this way, 
the acquired firm is likely to be better able to play the knowledge broker role and 
transfer its knowledge to the acquiring firm about how to work with the inherited 
alliance partner and about how the inherited alliance operates. Consequently, 
being able to rely on a party that has a thorough understanding of how the inherited 
alliance goals can be the most effectively achieved will decrease the acquiring firm’s 
information asymmetry concerns related to such an inherited alliance.  
At the same time, trust developed through the joint collaboration history 
enables the acquired firm to mediate more effectively any relational problems that 
may arise between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner. The 
emergence of conflict or at least disagreements between the acquiring firm and the 
inherited alliance partner is rather inevitable due to the need of formal 
incorporation of the acquiring firm into the partnership in the post-acquisition 
period (Datta, 1991). This implies substantial uncertainty for the inherited alliance 
and room for distrust between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance 
partner. The mutual trust built through collaboration history with the inherited 
alliance partner allows the acquired firm to more effectively mediate the disputes 
(Lioukas & Reuer, 2015; Zollo et al., 2002). The inherited alliance partner will more 
likely trust in the acquired firm’s ability to choose the right conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and consequently, it will make the acquired firm’s relational 
mediation process more effective. In partnerships, in which there is no extensive 
history of joint collaboration, it is less likely that there will be enough trust between 
the partners to follow the relational mediation strategies of the acquired firm. In 
this way, when trust is existent, the acquired firm can reduce the coordination 
issues and contribute to recovering the inherited alliance stability more effectively 
than when it has no joint collaboration history with the inherited alliance partner.  
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Based on the foregoing discussion, we expect that the acquired firm is 
better able to reduce the information asymmetries and coordination considerations 
in an inherited alliance in which the history of collaboration between the acquired 
and inherited partner is extensive. This will ultimately lead to higher inherited 
alliance’s resilience. Relying on prior alliance research, we consider two 
manifestations of joint collaboration history. While the first one refers to the 
history of prior transactions between the acquired firm and the inherited alliance 
partner (e.g., Gulati 1995), the other one refers to the pre-acquisition age of the 
inherited alliance (e.g., Hashai, Kafouros, & Buckley, 2015). Hence, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: A history of prior alliance transactions between the 
acquired and inherited alliance partner increases the 
inherited alliance’s resilience.  
Hypothesis 2b: The longer the inherited alliance existed prior to the 
alliance partner acquisition, the higher the inherited 
alliance’s resilience.  
3.3.3. Preservation integration strategy  
Acquisition literature stresses that acquiring firms can choose between different 
integration approaches when it comes to the incorporation of acquired firms into 
their structures. Generally, an acquiring firm has a choice between preservation 
and absorption strategies (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). The first one is 
concerned with structural separation, i.e., the acquired firm is under the ownership 
of the acquirer but these two entities remain distinct and operate separately. The 
latter is related to structural integration, i.e., the incorporation of the acquired firm 
into the acquirer’s organizational boundaries and adjustment of its current 
operations as well as location of authority, work space, rules and procedures 
(Cording, Christmann, & King, 2008; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam, Singh & 
Chaudhuri, 2009).  
When the acquired firm is integrated through a preservation strategy, it 
maintains substantial autonomy and is likely to conduct its business in the same or 
highly similar way than before the acquisition. When preserving the acquired firm, 
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the acquiring firm maintains a boundary between itself and the acquired firm. 
Therefore, a preservation strategy gives substantial independence to the acquired 
firm in alliance related decision-making processes. In that sense, the acquired firm 
retains the management responsibilities that it had up to the event of the 
acquisition and remains the main party interacting with the inherited alliance 
partner. Therefore, the inherited alliance is unlikely to experience a major 
disruption due to the new ownership of its partner. In contrast, when the acquired 
firm is absorbed, its operations are combined with those of the acquiring firm 
within the same set of organizational boundaries. More precisely, the processes 
become standardized, common hierarchical control is introduced, and thus the 
previous organizational arrangement of the acquired firm is largely eliminated 
(Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2006). In this latter case, we expect that coordination 
and information asymmetry challenges are more outspoken, jeopardizing the 
resilience of the inherited alliance. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The choice for a post-acquisition preservation (absorption) 
strategy is likely to increase (decrease) inherited alliance’s 
resilience.  
3.4. METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1. Data and Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed a new dataset of inherited alliances in the 
biotechnology industry. We rely on this industry because of its rich activity in both 
alliances and acquisitions (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Initially, we identified 
107 majority acquisitions pursued by the 50 best performing biotechnology firms 
(based on their 2004 revenue) over the period between 1996 and 2010. Next, we 
determined in which of these acquisitions the inherited alliances were present. 
Following these steps, we identified 63 acquisition deals, in which the acquired firm 
was engaged in active alliances. The total number of all identified inherited 
alliances was 232. Because we were not able to obtain data for some of the inherited 
alliances, the final sample reduced to 213 inherited alliances.  
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3.4.2. Data Sources 
We identified the acquisitions using SDC Mergers & Acquisitions, corporate 
reporting (annual reports, SEC 10-K and 20-F) and acquisition statements (8-K 
filings). Subsequently, we searched in the LexisNexis7 database for press releases 
providing information whether the acquired firm was engaged in strategic alliances 
at the moment of the acquisition. Once we determined the active alliances, we 
looked for specific pre- and post-acquisition information about each inherited 
alliance. More specifically, we used archival press releases from LexisNexis 
database and annual reports to determine pre- and post-acquisition alliance 
duration. For all alliances, we were able to find their exact starting dates. For some 
alliances, we were also able to find their termination date. For those alliances for 
which we did not find an exact termination date, we followed the approach of Ahuja 
(2000). More precisely, we assumed that an alliance continued until the last year 
in which it was mentioned or until the year after the year in which it was formed, 
whichever was later. 
We also collected patent information. We used the data from Harvard 
Patent Network Dataverse to collect the information on the patent classes in which 
the firms patented, which we used to calculate the technological relatedness 
between the different parties. In addition, we used VentureXpert to collect data on 
venture capital investments and LexisNexis press releases, acquisition statement 
(SEC 8-K filings), and annual reports to gather data regarding the post-acquisition 
integration strategy. Orbis database and Google search were used to obtain the 
information on the physical location of the firms. We also triangulated LexisNexis-
based data with the ReCap’s Biotech Alliance Database to gain a clear picture of 
whether the acquirers had themselves entered into alliances with the inherited 
alliance partners prior to the acquisition as well as whether the acquirers and the 
                                                 
7 LexisNexis is a provider of legal, government, business and high-tech information sources. It archives 
press releases about firms and their activities (e.g. formation and termination of alliances, acquisitions), 
which allowed us to obtain comprehensive information essential to the completion our study. As 
previous research shows (e.g. Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Phelps, 2010), SDC Database Alliance & JVs has a 
low coverage of alliances and therefore using press releases for alliance identification is considered 
nowadays more effective. We developed a unique search algorithm, which allowed us to find the relevant 
alliances. The algorithm is available upon request.  
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To determine whether an alliance was resilient to an alliance partner acquisition, 
we considered the industry mean of inherited alliance duration (= 32 months), 
which represents a measure of central tendency in the dataset. An inherited 
alliance that was able to continue for at least the mean duration or longer, exhibits 
a distinctive ability to continuously thrive given the event of an alliance partner 
acquisition by a third firm, compared to an alliance that was not able to reach that 
point. It therefore serves well as a benchmarking point of whether the inherited 
alliance was better able to deal with the event of the alliance partner acquisition. 
Consequently, the continuation of the inherited alliance for at least 32 months after 
the acquisition was interpreted to indicate that the inherited alliance was resilient 
(alliance resilience to alliance partner acquisition = 1). If the inherited alliance 
continued for less than an inherited alliance on average did, we interpreted this to 
mean that the inherited alliance was less resilient to the event of alliance partner 
acquisition (alliance resilience to alliance partner acquisition = 0).  
 We also conducted robustness tests (see page 69 for details) with an 
alternative dependent variable, in which we consider the inherited alliance’s 
resilience as a function of post-acquisition duration, i.e., how long the inherited 
alliance existed after the acquisition until its termination (in months). The results 
of these analyses provide highly similar results. 
Independent Variables 
Our first hypothesis suggested a positive effect of technological relatedness 
between the acquired firm and inherited alliance partner on the alliance resilience 
to an alliance partner acquisition by a third firm. Following previous research (see 
e.g., Jaffe, 1986; Sampson 2007) we measured the technological relatedness 
between the two firms as the extent to which the two patent in the same technology 
classes in the five years period prior to the acquisition. We also conducted 
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robustness checks, in which we applied a three and seven years window and found 
consistent results. Using this measure allows us to capture the technological 
position of one partner relative to another (Sampson, 2007). In order to construct 
this variable, we measured the distribution of patents across patent classifications 
across the five years preceding the acquisition. This distribution is captured by a 
multidimensional vector, 𝐹𝑖 = (𝐹𝑖
1 … 𝐹𝑖
𝑠, where 𝐹𝑖
𝑠 represents the number of patents 
assigned to partner firm i in patent class s. The measure calculates the 
technological relatedness between a pair of firms. Technological relatedness varies 
from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a perfect overlap in technological base between the 
firms. The formula for the technological relatedness is denoted as follows: 




 The second hypothesis (2a) tests the impact of prior alliance ties between 
the acquired firm and inherited alliance partner on the post-acquisition alliance 
resilience. Using the extensive alliance information both from the ReCap and 
LexisNexis databases and following Reuer and Devarakonda (2017), we counted 
the number of alliances between the firms during the five years prior to the focal 
alliance. In our sample, we did not encounter cases in which the acquired firm and 
the inherited alliance partner had more than one other tie in that period. We coded 
this variable as 1 if the firms had an alliance in the past five years prior to the focal 
alliance. If there were no prior ties between the two, we coded it with 0.  
To examine whether the pre-acquisition alliance duration positively 
influences the alliance resilience to an alliance partner acquisition in hypothesis 
2b, we calculated the number of months an alliance existed from the moment of its 
formation to the acquisition of one of the alliance partners. We use a log-
transformed variable to account for skewness of the data.  
 The last hypothesis argues that when an acquired firm is preserved after 
its acquisition, it is more likely that the alliance in which it was engaged is resilient 
to the alliance partner acquisition. To assess whether the acquired firm was 
structurally absorbed or preserved, we examined press releases in the LexisNexis 
database in the years after the acquisition to check whether the acquired firm was 
continuously traceable under its name (Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 
2006; 2009). Simultaneously, we also checked annual reports and SEC 8-K 
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acquisition statements to see whether the acquired firm was reported to function 
as a distinct operational unit after the acquisition, for example, as a wholly owned 
subsidiary or separate unit or division (Paurchuri, 2006), to account for cases that 
might have changed names for legal purposes, such as clinical trials but their 
operations remained autonomous. If the acquired firm kept showing up under its 
name in the press releases after a year following the acquisition, indicating that it 
retained its distinct status as operating entity, or if the acquired firm changed the 
name but was functioning as a distinct operational unit, we considered that the 
acquired firm was preserved (structural preservation = 1). However, if the 
acquired firm was not traceable anymore as a distinct organizational entity in 
neither the press releases nor company statements, we assumed that it was 
structurally absorbed (structural preservation = 0). Out of all inherited alliances, 
73% of them fell into preservation category, whereas 27% into absorption category.  
Control Variables 
Acquirer’s direct relationships with both the acquired firm and inherited alliance 
partner may also have an impact on the resilience of the inherited alliance to the 
alliance partner acquisition by a third firm. Therefore, we accounted for several 
aspects. First, we controled for the characteristics of the relationship between the 
acquirer and the acquired firm and the acquirer and the inherited alliance partner. 
We included the variable prior alliance tie between the acquirer and acquired firm 
(Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010) since such a tie provides the acquiring firm 
with information about how the acquired firm manages its alliances, and therefore 
the acquiring firm can anticipate how it can approach the inherited alliances by 
itself. We coded this variable with 1 if the acquisition was preceded by a strategic 
alliance between the acquiring and acquired firm, and with 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
we accounted for recent acquirer’s direct collaboration experience with the 
inherited alliance partner and included the variable prior ties between the 
acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner (Reuer & Devarakonda &, 2017). 
We measured this variable by looking whether the two had an alliance with each 
other up to five years prior to the acquisition of the alliance partner. We coded the 
variable with 1 if such prior alliance ties were present, if not, we coded it with 0. We 
also looked a step further and controlled for the indirect ties between the acquiring 
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firm’s original alliances and the inherited alliance partner. We used a dummy 
variable to indicate whether in the previous five years the acquiring firm and the 
inherited alliance partner had at least one alliance partner in common (Boyd & 
Spekman, 2008).  
In addition to that, we also considered the technological relatedness 
between acquirer and inherited alliance partner as the extent to which the two are 
related might influence the recombination potential and thus the incentive to 
rebound and recover or terminate an alliance (Sampson, 2007). The 
operationalization of this variable followed the same formula as explained in the 
independent variables section, only here it concerns the acquirer (instead of the 
acquired firm) and the inherited alliance partner. We also controlled for the 
technological relatedness between the acquirer and the acquired firm.  
 Furthermore, we also included several control variables to account for firm 
specific characteristics for both the acquirer and the inherited alliance partner. 
Depending on the extent to which the acquiring firm is engaging in acquisitions 
and alliances might affect its capacity in terms of resource and managerial 
commitments as well as influence its managerial capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2006). Hence, we controlled for i) Acquirer’s acquisition intensity, which we 
calculated as the total number of acquisitions the firm has pursued in the past five 
years, ii) Acquirer’s alliance experience, which we operationalized as the total 
number of alliances the firm has formed in the past five years, iii) Number of all 
inherited alliances in the year of acquisition, which we computed as the total 
number of alliances brought along acquisitions, the acquirer had to manage in the 
year of acquisition. Finally, we also considered the number of unique VC investors 
investing in acquirer as a proxy for quality and resource capacity (Reuer & 
Devarakonda, 2017). Similarly, we accounted for the inherited alliance partner’s 
acquisition intensity,, inherited alliance partner’s alliance experience, number of 
unique VC investors investing in the inherited alliance partner and whether the 
alliance partner of the acquired firm was a Big Pharma firm (=1 if yes, =0 if not) 
according to the revenue in the year of acquisition.  
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3.4.4. Estimation Approach 
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable (inherited alliance’s 
resilience), we used logistic regression estimation model with robust standard 
errors clustered by acquiring firms. We also included year dummies to account for 
macro-economic changes over time. We chose this approach because we do not 
encounter censoring issue regarding the inherited alliance duration, i.e., we were 
able to collect data on their starting and termination dates (George, Seals, & Aban, 
2014; Yu & Canella, 2007).  
3.5. RESULTS 
In Table 3.1., we present descriptive statistics and correlations. We observe that 
28% of alliances experiencing an event of alliance partner acquisition is resilient to 
this re-configurational change and that in 11% of alliances the acquired firm and its 
alliance partner had prior alliance ties. The mean technological relatedness 
between the acquired firm and its alliance partner is 0.30. We also observe that the 
average pre-acquisition duration of an inherited alliance is equal to 34 months and 
that more than 70% of the inherited alliances were managed under the post-
acquisition preservation strategy. To check for potential multicollinearity issues, 
we did several checks. There is no correlation above the common threshold of 0.8. 
Furthermore, the average (=1.70) and the highest (=3.15) variance inflation factor 
values are below the common multicollinearity threshold of 5 and 10 (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988). This evidence 




Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
   Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Inherited alliance’s resilience  0.28 0.45 1.00 
                 
Technological relatedness between the 
acquired firm and inherited alliance 
partner 
 0.30  0.42 0.03 1.00 
                
Prior ties between the acquired firm and 
inherited alliance partner 
 0.11  0.31 0.02 0.01 1.00 
               
Pre-acquisition alliance duration (ln)  3.02  1.13 0.19 0.16 -0.07 1.00 
              
Preservation post-acquisition integration 
strategy 
0.73 0.44 0.18 0.19 -0.03 0.03 1.00 
             
Technological relatedness between 
acquirer and acquired firm 
0.14  0.30 -0.11 0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.00 1.00 
            
Technological relatedness between 
acquirer and inherited alliance partner 
 0.11  0.28 -0.05 0.24 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 0.45 1.00 
           
Prior ties between the acquirer and 
acquired firm 
 0.24 0.43 -0.03 0.03 0.37 -0.02 -0.35 -0.06 -0.05 1.00 
          
Prior ties between acquirer and inherited 
alliance partner 
 0.10  0.30 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 1.00 
         
Indirect ties between the acquirer’s home-
grown alliances and inherited alliances 
 0.20  0.40 -0.02 -0.04 0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 -0.12 0.12 0.15 1.00 
        
Acquirer’s acquisition intensity  3.04  2.36 -0.17 0.04 -0.06 0.08 -0.12 -0.28 -0.20 0.18 0.01 0.01 1.00 
       
Inherited alliance partner’s acquisition 
intensity 
 2.33  4.40 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.06 0.13 0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.16 0.18 -0.08 1.00 
      
Acquirer’s alliance experience 27.29 18.21 -0.14 0.06 0.14 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.38 0.03 0.14 0.72 -0.08 1.00 
     
Inherited alliance partner’s alliance 
experience 
11.12 14.65 0.18 -0.03 0.12 0.10 0.16 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03 0.14 0.30 -0.12 0.61 -0.10 1.00 
    
Number of all inherited alliances in the 
year of acquisition 
 7.55  6.32 -0.10 0.09 0.24 0.02 0.23 0.39 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07 -0.15 0.11 0.14 0.06 1.00 
   
Number of unique VC investors investing 
in acquirer 
 0.35  0.86 0.19 0.00 -0.14 0.06 0.08 -0.14 -0.05 -0.18 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.02 1.00 
  
Number of unique VC investors investing 
in inherited alliance partner 
 0.67  2.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.00 -0.07 -0.06 0.16 0.13 0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.04 -0.15 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
 
Inherited alliance partner is a Big Pharma 
firm 
 0.16  0.37 0.04 -0.15 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.13 -0.03 -0.16 0.15 0.31 -0.12 0.60 -0.09 0.65 0.19 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 
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Table 3.2. presents the results of the stepwise logistic regression analyses 
in which we tested the determinants of alliance resilience to an alliance partner 
acquisition. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes only the control variables. 
In models 2, 3, 4, and 5 we test the hypotheses separately, while in model 6 we 
included all variables together. To discuss the findings of our analyses, we will 
make use of the results in Model 6, since the general insights derived from model 1 
to 5 are rather similar. 
Contrary to our expectations, the effect of technological relatedness 
between the acquired firm and inherited alliance partner is not significant, thus 
failing to provide support for H1. With respect to the history of joint collaboration 
history, we considered its two manifestations and the analysis provides compelling 
results with respect to them. Hypothesis 2a states that prior alliance ties between 
the acquired firm and its alliance partner will increase the likelihood of alliance 
resilience to the alliance partner acquisition. The result is, however, not significant 
and thus we find no support for H2a. In our hypothesis 2b, we expected that the 
longer an alliance existed prior to the acquisition, the higher the likelihood of 
alliance resilience to the alliance partner acquisition. The coefficient for the pre-
acquisition alliance duration is positive and significant, which provides support to 
H2b. In our last hypothesis, we expected that if the acquired firm will be preserved 
after the acquisition, it is more likely that the inherited alliance will be able to 
withstand and recover from the alliance partner acquisition. The result is positive 
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Table 3.2. Logistic regression results (DV alliance resilience: =1 if an alliance continues to exist 
after the alliance partner acquisition for longer than the sample mean (32 months); 
=0 otherwise). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)      (6) 
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Observations 213 213 213 213 213 213 
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.158 0.157 0.186 0.182 0.215 













Note. All regressions were estimated using clustered (robust) standard errors, which are reported in parentheses. The 
significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include a set of year dummies, which are 




Looking at the control variables, our results also point to the positive role 
of prior direct ties between the acquirer and the inherited alliance partner, and 
inherited alliance partner’s alliance experience. In relation to the first factor, it 
seems that prior direct ties between the acquirer and inherited alliance partner are 
an important predictor of alliance resilience to the alliance partner acquisition. In 
such a case, the two parties have their partner-specific coordination patterns, 
routines and trust (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lioukas & Reuer, 2015), 
and can use this basis to operate the inherited collaboration. With respect to the 
second factor – inherited alliance partner’s alliance experience implies that the 
inherited alliance partner might be more able to effectively address and manage 
different situations in alliances (Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009).  
Our results also point to two characteristics that negatively influence the 
likelihood of alliance resilience to an acquisition of an alliance partner. We have 
found that the greater the acquisition activity of the acquirer, the lower the 
likelihood of alliance resilience to an alliance partner acquisition. Pursuing 
acquisitions implies high costs and resource deployments (e.g., Balakrishnan & 
Koza, 1993; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). The more acquisitions the 
acquirer pursues, the more resources it will need to complete these takeovers and 
integrate the acquired firms. Therefore, it is likely that there will be not enough 
resources left for the alliance of the acquired firm, hindering the recovery from the 
alliance partner acquisition. We observe the same pattern for the number of all 
inherited alliances the acquiring firm inherits in an acquisition(s). It will require 
substantial resource commitments and managerial attention of the acquirer to deal 
with all these inherited alliances and substantial navigation efforts from the 
acquired firm(s). Thus, while the resource and managerial requirements are rather 
high, the acquirer does not have sufficient resource and managerial capacity to 
satisfy the needs of all of these partnerships (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Egelhoff, 1991; 




3.5.1. Additional Tests 
The aim of this study was to reveal under which conditions the inherited alliances 
are able to exhibit more resilience to the event of an alliance partner acquisition. 
An alternative way to look at this issue is to study the post-acquisition alliance 
duration, i.e., how long the inherited alliance existed after the acquisition until its 
termination (in months). While this alternative approach does not include the 
benchmarking procedure, it can provide somewhat similar insights on whether an 
alliance is likely to be ended sooner or later depending on particular conditions. As 
mentioned earlier, our data does not suffer from censoring, hence standard 
regression procedures suffice (George, Seals, & Aban, 2014; Yu & Canella, 2007). 
In Table 3.3., we present three models. In the first model, we present results of a 
multiple regression analysis with the dependent variable: number of months an 
inherited alliance continued after the alliance partner acquisition, which is a 
continuous variable. In the second model, we also performed a multiple regression 
analysis with the difference that we log-transformed the dependent variable to 
account for the fact that the dependent variable does not include negative values. 
Finally, in the third model we performed Cox event history analysis, in which we 
looked at the hazard rates of the termination happening earlier vs. later. The results 




Table 3.3. Additional tests    
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Observations 213 213 213 
R-squared 0.2269 0.2099 - 
F-statistic 170.33*** 130.40*** - 
Log lik. - - -907.6 
Chi-squared - - 5453.3*** 
Note. All regressions were estimated using robust standard errors (clustered by acquiring firm), which are reported in 
parentheses. The significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a Estimates are regression 
coefficients. b Estimates are hazard ratios (hazard rate > 1 indicates that the probability of an event happening (alliance 




In this study, we set out to examine the resilience of an alliance to an acquisition of 
one alliance partner by a third firm. In particular, we looked at the conditions under 
which the acquired firm is able to navigate the unique challenges associated with 
inherited alliances. Drawing on a quantitative analysis of inherited alliances in 
biotechnology sector, we found two conditions under which alliance resilience to 
an acquisition is more likely: (i) the longer the inherited alliance existed prior to 
the alliance partner acquisition and (ii) if the acquiring firm preserved the acquired 
firm. In the following, we discuss the core insights of this study and show how they 
contribute to the existing post-formation alliance dynamics and acquisition 
literatures. 
3.6.1. Implications for Alliance and Acquisition Research  
Recent research has called for further exploration of partner reconfiguration 
patterns in alliances and their implications (e.g., Bakker, 2016). We contribute to 
addressing this call by pointing to a particular type of post-formation 
configurational change in alliances that has deserved limited attention, the 
acquisition of one of the alliance partners by a third firm. We identified specific 
challenges that such an event brings along for the inherited alliance: information 
asymmetries between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partner, and 
coordination challenges. Moreover, we posited that the acquired firm is able to help 
the acquiring firm in navigating these challenges by acting as a knowledge broker 
and a relational mediator. We found that the acquired firm is able to execute better 
these roles when the alliance lasted longer prior to the acquisition. Our results also 
show that inherited alliance’s resilience is higher when the acquired firm was 
structurally preserved after the acquisition. 
Relying on the insights from organizational learning literature, prior 
research has highlighted the importance of making a distinction between general 
and partner-specific experience (e.g., Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005).  In our study, we considered two manifestations of partner-
specific collaboration history and observe that one of these manifestations is 
particularly beneficial in the context of inherited alliance’s resilience. Specifically, 
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we find that the pre-acquisition duration of the inherited alliance, and thus 
partner-specific experience within a particular alliance, rather than repeated 
alliance ties, and thus partner-specific experience across alliances, exerts an 
important influence over alliance resilience. One possible explanation of the non-
significant effect of repeated ties between the acquired firm and the inherited 
alliance partner on inherited alliance’s resilience is that prior alliances can be a 
better predictor of formation of a new alliance with the same partner (Reuer et al., 
2002) or how to design it (Gulati, 1995). However, prior alliance ties may not be 
enough to improve the chances of withstanding and recovering from a major re-
configurational change in an alliance. While prior alliance ties can provide reliable 
information about past performance with a particular alliance partner based on 
interactions in previous alliances (see Gulati, 1995), in the event of the acquisition 
of one of the alliance partners this experience might not provide enough recent and 
relevant information. In contrast, a single long-lasting alliance provides 
information related to current history (Hashai et al., 2015) that might be more 
relevant to address a re-configurational change. Hence, in the context of 
acquisitions, the acquired firm is going to be better able to fulfill its navigating roles 
using present experience.  
Further, our results inform the post-formation alliance dynamics literature 
by examining the role of the technological relatedness between the acquiring firm 
and the inherited alliance partner in explaining the alliance resilience to an alliance 
partner acquisition. Existing alliance literature identified high technological 
relatedness between alliance partners as an enabler of deep mutual understanding 
of each other’s technological capabilities (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998). We expected that, the more the acquired firm and the inherited alliance 
partner are technologically related, the greater the potential the acquired firm has 
to broker the technology-based knowledge to the acquiring firm, and thus to reduce 
the acquirer’s informational disadvantage. Yet our findings reveal that having a 
high level of technological relatedness with the inherited alliance partner does not 
significantly improve the acquired firm’s ability to broker knowledge about the 
partner’s resources and capabilities. A possible explanation for this result is that 
extensive shared technological understanding between alliance partners can be 
more powerful when structuring collaboration arrangements rather than in the 
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post-formation period in which alliance-specific knowledge may be more relevant 
than the general shared technological know-how (Reuer et al., 2002). Throughout 
a collaboration, partnering firms might have developed sufficient understanding of 
the one another’s resources and capabilities. Hence, independently of the level of 
the technological relatedness with the inherited alliance partner, the acquired firm 
might be able to reduce sufficiently the information asymmetries of the acquiring 
firm. For that reason, we might not be finding the specific impact of high 
technological relatedness on the inherited alliance’s resilience. Future research 
could consider other aspects of technology that may have an impact on the alliance 
resilience. For example, our data did not allow us to take a deeper look at the 
technology or product development stage. The more the technology and/or product 
is developed or marketed in the alliance, the less uncertainties and knowledge gaps 
are present for the partners, and thus acquired firm’s ability to reduce the 
information asymmetries between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance 
partner would be higher. 
Our study also helps to advance our knowledge about the consequences of 
particular post-acquisition integration approaches. Typically, acquisition scholars 
have focused their efforts on studying the impact of post-acquisition integration 
choices on post-acquisition firm performance (e.g., Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; 
Cording et al., 2008; Datta, 1991; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2006; 
Zollo & Singh, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, previous acquisition research 
does not go beyond the direct consequences of acquisitions for the acquiring firm. 
Our paper shows that post-acquisition integration strategy may have broader 
consequences, i.e., for other stakeholders than just the acquiring and acquired firm. 
In particular, we observe in our analysis that alliances, in which the alliance partner 
(=acquired firm) has been preserved are more likely to have the ability to deal with 
alliance partner acquisition. As such, the inter-firm cooperation activity of the 
remaining alliance partner (=inherited alliance partner) depends largely on how its 
alliance partner (=acquired firm) has been integrated. In other words, the post-
acquisition integration strategy does not only influence the acquirer’s performance, 




Our study has some limitations, which at the same time provide an interesting 
starting point for future research. First, we tested out theory on a sample of 
inherited alliances in the biotechnology industry. Although we expect that our 
findings are likely to hold for other alliance and acquisition intensive industries, 
future research can test the generalizability of our study. Second, while this study 
considered dyadic alliances, future work could examine the dynamics of multiparty 
alliances and/or joint ventures. The involvement of three or more firms may 
radically change the need for the navigating role of the acquired firm. Third, our 
study provided the first evidence that the acquired firm can play an important role 
in making the inherited alliance resilient to the acquisition of the alliance partner. 
Due to data limitations, we were unable to capture the actual process of knowledge 
brokerage and relational mediation. Using a longitudinal case study approach, 
future research could investigate the process of managing information 
asymmetries and coordination challenges by the acquired firm. In this way, we 
could develop deeper insights into how the involvement of the acquired firm 
evolves over time and at which post-acquisition stages this involvement is the most 
essential for the resilience of the inherited alliance. Finally, we would also like to 
encourage scholars to study whether the inherited alliances that withstand and 
recover from the acquisition of the alliance partner open new collaboration 
opportunities or possibly create conflicts in the alliance portfolio of the acquiring 
firm and force the acquirer to terminate some of its existing alliances. Determining 
the conditions under which formation of new alliances and termination of old ones 
is more likely, would provide further interesting insights into post-formation 







In this paper, we pointed to another type of re-configurational partner change, i.e., 
a situation in which one of the alliance partners is acquired by an external firm. We 
posited and examined the role of the acquired firm as a navigator of the 
coordination challenges and information asymmetry between the acquiring firm 
and the inherited alliance partner, which facilitates the alliance resilience to the 
alliance partner acquisition. Our empirical analysis provides strong support that 
especially the alliance specific history of joint collaboration as well as preservation 
of the acquired firm help the alliance to withstand and recover from this event. 
Addressing this type of change allows us to show a new source of dynamism in 









Post-Acquisition Integration Strategic Choices: 









While prior research has acknowledged that acquiring firms consider the in-house 
resources and capabilities of acquired firms when making decisions regarding their 
integration, it has ignored the possibility that some acquired firms might have 
access to shared resources and capabilities through their strategic alliances. We 
refer to an acquired firm’s alliances as inherited alliances. We posit that the value-
disruption risks in acquisitions that include many inherited alliances are greater 
than in acquisitions that do not include such partnerships. Therefore, we expect a 
preservation strategy to become more likely when the number of inherited alliances 
in an acquisition is high, and we propose that this relationship is moderated by the 
presence of an acquisition-preceding alliance between the acquiring and acquired 
firm. Based on a sample of acquisitions in the biotechnology sector, we find support 
for both hypotheses. Our findings contribute to the post-acquisition integration 
literature by uncovering an important antecedent of integration decisions that lies 
beyond the internal boundaries of the acquired firms. Our findings also add to 
research at the intersection of alliances and acquisitions, as they indicate that there 
are unique interdependencies between alliances and acquisitions that shape 
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Firms often pursue acquisitions—transactions in which one company purchases a 
majority stake in another firm and takes control over it (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002)—in order to gain access to necessary resources, capabilities, and new 
markets (Graebner, 2004; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). An important factor 
that influences the extent of gains from an acquisition is the choice of post-
acquisition integration strategy (e.g., Puranam et al., 2006; Zaheer, Castañer, & 
Souder, 2013), especially in terms of whether the acquiring firm chooses to 
structurally absorb (i.e., to combine formerly distinct units into the same 
organization) or to preserve the acquired firm (i.e., to keep the acquired firm as a 
separate entity). In their discussions of the determinants of post-acquisition 
integration choices, scholars have focused on the impact of the acquired firm’s in-
house resources and capabilities, and the extent to which those resources and 
capabilities provide value-creating opportunities and involve value-disrupting 
risks (Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009; Zaheer et al., 2013).  
The extant literature has implicitly assumed that all of the acquired firm’s 
resources and capabilities are concentrated within it. However, as acquired firms 
do not exist in a vacuum, this implicit assumption provides a limited picture of 
what the acquired firm brings into the acquisition and the implications thereof. 
Aside from the in-house resources and capabilities specific to the internal 
operations of the acquired firm, the acquired firm may provide access to shared 
resources and capabilities that are located and embedded in its strategic alliances—
voluntary arrangements between firms involving the exchange, sharing, or co-
development of products, technologies, or services (Gulati, 1995). We observe that 
in the biotechnology industry, more than 60% of all acquisition targets are involved 
in alliance agreements. We refer to the partnerships of acquired firm as “inherited 
alliances,” as the acquiring firm inherits them at the time of the acquisition.  
The resources and capabilities of an acquired firm that is involved in 
alliances are not solely concentrated within its internal boundaries. Instead, they 
are dispersed across the firm and its alliance partners. At the same time, when an 
acquisition involves inherited alliances, the acquiring firm must cross multiple 
interfaces to access the acquired firm’s resources (i.e., the acquired firm and the 
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inherited alliances). Such resource dispersion and a high number of interfaces may 
create substantial difficulties for an acquiring firm in terms of assimilating valuable 
resources and working with different stakeholders. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which inherited 
alliances determine the acquiring firm's integration decisions. We rely on insights 
from the resource-based view, the acquisition literature, and alliance research (e.g., 
Garette & Dussauge, 2000; Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011) to 
argue that the greater the number of alliances the acquiring firm inherits in an 
acquisition, the higher the dispersion of resources and, therefore, the lower the 
value-creation opportunities for the acquiring firm. In addition, we argue that the 
higher the number of inherited alliances, the more interfaces the acquiring firm has 
to cross, which triggers higher value-disruption risks. For these reasons, it becomes 
less likely that the acquirer will decide to structurally absorb the acquired firm and 
structural preservation becomes more likely. We also expect this positive effect of 
a higher number of inherited alliances on the likelihood of a preservation strategy 
to become less pronounced if the acquirer and the acquired firm were involved in 
a pre-acquisition relationship. 
To test our hypotheses, we collected data on acquisitions undertaken by 
the top 50 biotechnology firms from 1996 to 2010. We relied on the SDC Mergers 
& Acquisitions database, press releases found in the LexisNexis database, 
Harvard’s Patent Network Dataverse database, and annual reports to gather the 
relevant data. We were able to obtain complete information for 100 acquisitions. 
In line with our proposed theory, we find that the greater the number of inherited 
alliances in an acquisition deal, the more likely it is that the acquired firm will be 
structurally preserved. We also observe that an acquisition-preceding relationship 
between the acquirer and acquired firm attenuates the extent to which the acquirer 
struggles with the limited value-creation opportunities and the greater value-
disruption risks associated with acquisitions that include numerous inherited 
alliances. Therefore, such a relationship serves as a condition under which the 
acquirer is more likely to absorb the acquired firm.  
This study contributes to the post-acquisition integration strategy 
literature (e.g., Haspelagh & Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2003; 
Puranam et al., 2009). Prior literature investigating the antecedents of integration 
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decisions has focused, both qualitatively and quantitatively, on the role of the 
acquired firm’s in-house resources and capabilities (Haspelagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Pablo, 1994; Puranam et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2013). Our study adds to this 
stream of research by highlighting the alliances of acquired firms as an important 
determinant of integration decisions. In this regard, we point to the importance of 
looking beyond the internal boundaries of the acquired firm.  
Our study also contributes to both alliance and acquisition research by 
showing the importance of connecting alliances to acquisitions and vice versa. 
While acquisitions and alliances are typically studied in separation, we show that 
there are unique interdependencies between them that can affect firms’ strategic 
decisions. In other words, alliances and acquisitions may not only influence how a 
firm performs but also the organizational-level choices it makes. 
4.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we first provide an overview of the value-creation opportunities and 
value-disruption risks that structural absorption creates for the acquiring firm. 
Subsequently, we discuss the coordination-autonomy dilemma and the extant 
literature on the antecedents of the acquiring firm’s post-acquisition integration 
choices.  
4.2.1. Creating Value through Structural Absorption  
When a firm acquires another firm, it faces the challenge of designing and 
implementing coordination mechanisms that allow it to reap optimal benefits from 
the acquisition (Puranam et al., 2006). Consequently, the acquiring firm’s 
decisions regarding the post-acquisition integration of the acquired firm are 
important.  
Structural absorption is an organizational design choice that combines the 
acquired firm with the parent unit. As such, it favors coordination mechanisms that 
link the two organizations tightly together (Puranam et al., 2006; 2009). The 
introduction of common authority and incentives as well as the standardization of 
processes, routines, and formal systems allow the acquiring firm to integrate the 
acquired firm into its organizational boundaries. Such an organizational structure 
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enables the acquiring firm to exploit value-creation opportunities and capitalize on 
synergies (Kale Singh & Raman, 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; 2009; Zaheer et al., 
2013). For example, through the combination of goals and reporting schemes, the 
acquiring firm simplifies coordination and facilitates mutual adaptation, which 
helps it to achieve economies of scale and scope. Absorption also aids in the 
reduction of overhead and operational costs through the elimination of redundant 
activities, and the sharing or transferring of resources and capabilities across the 
organization (e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Capron, 1999). 
4.2.2. Value-disruption Risks Associated with Structural Absorption 
Although structural absorption may provide value-creation opportunities, it may 
also disrupt the value the acquired firm contributes to the acquiring firm. 
Structural absorption implies alterations in the operational routines and activities 
of the acquired firm (Puranam et al., 2006; 2009), which may reduce the value of 
the acquisition (Kale et al., 2009). In particular, through the enforcement of the 
acquiring firm’s practices and interaction patterns, structural absorption has the 
potential to limit employees’ independence. Consequently, employees’ ambitions 
and capabilities will be undermined, and overall work satisfaction and morale will 
most likely decrease (Puranam et al., 2006; Zaheer et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the implementation of the acquiring firm’s routines in the 
acquired firm might be inefficient and ineffective. Often, part of the value of an 
acquired firm resides in how it handles its operations. Hence, depriving the 
acquired firm of its established and proven practices may disrupt its business and, 
thus, the value of the acquisition. The acquiring firm may struggle to preserve the 
value of the acquisition or it might even destroy it if it chooses to structurally absorb 
the acquired entity (Zaheer et al., 2013).  
4.2.3. The Coordination-Autonomy Dilemma 
When deciding whether to absorb an acquired firm, the acquiring firm has to weigh 
the value-creation opportunities against the value-disruption risks. When the 
value-disruption risks related to absorption outweigh the value-creation 
opportunities, such that the need for autonomy exceeds the need for coordination, 
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acquiring firms tend to structurally preserve the acquired firm (Zaheer et al., 2013; 
Puranam et al., 2006; 2009). The structural preservation strategy implies that the 
activities of the acquiring and the acquired firm will be under common ownership 
but the firms will remain organizationally separate.  
Organizational separation requires the acquiring firm to rely on the 
competences of the acquired firm and its willingness to work towards realization of 
the full acquisition value. Moreover, this strategy usually does not reduce costs to 
the same extent as absorption (Zaheer et al., 2013). While these characteristics may 
make the preservation strategy seem challenging, the acquiring firm can more 
easily maintain the acquired firm’s innovation capacity (Puranam et al., 2006; 
2009), as the acquired firm is allowed to retain its business practices. This should 
help maintain the motivation and productivity of the acquired firm’s key personnel 
(Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2006). In addition, more time can be 
invested in the daily operations of the acquired firm rather than in reorganization 
efforts (Kale et al., 2009) that would most likely destroy the value that resides in 
the acquired firm’s routines. 
4.2.4. Determinants of Post-acquisition Integration Strategies 
The extant research on the determinants of post-acquisition integration choices 
focuses on the conditions under which the coordination benefits of absorption 
exceed the disruption of the acquired firm. More specifically, some evidence 
suggests that when there is significant overlap between the acquiring and acquired 
firms’ internal resources, the acquiring firm has more opportunities to realize 
synergies (Datta & Grant, 1990; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Zaheer et al., 2013). 
This is because the acquiring firm’s personnel are familiar with the types of 
knowledge and operations in the acquired firm. As such, they have the knowledge 
needed to absorb the acquired firm into the acquiring firm’s structures (Datta & 
Grant, 1990). The acquiring firm can work on achieving “economies of sameness” 
(Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999, p. 6) through task specialization, the elimination of 
redundancies, and greater productivity (Colombo & Rabiossi, 2014). Similarly, 
when the acquired firm’s knowledge is not complex, such as when it is embedded 
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in single components rather than standalone products composed of multiple 
components, the acquiring firm is likely to absorb it (Puranam et al., 2009). 
Scholars also examine the circumstances under which the value-disruption 
risks are likely to outweigh the value-creation opportunities and, thus, to favor a 
preservation strategy. This is often the case when the acquiring firm has little 
understanding and experience in the knowledge domain of the acquired firm’s 
products or technologies, and when the acquired firm’s technologies and products 
are highly complex and intertwined (Puranam et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2013). 
Therefore, acquiring firms that take over firms with less familiar or even unfamiliar 
assets are more inclined to choose a preservation strategy (Zaheer et al., 2013) in 
order to provide a more autonomous environment for the employees of the 
acquired firm. Such an environment helps maintain the motivation of the acquired 
firm’s personnel through the promotion of cooperation and knowledge sharing. It 
also allows for the development of ideas for combining the complementary 
knowledge residing in the acquired firm with the expertise present in the acquiring 
firm without destroying the former (Colombo & Rabiossi, 2014; Zaheer et al., 
2013).  
Researchers studying this coordination-autonomy dilemma have largely 
ignored the fact that acquired firms have not only in-house resources and 
capabilities but also access to the shared resources and capabilities that are 
embedded in its strategic alliances. We refer to such alliances as inherited alliances, 
as the acquiring firm inherits such partnerships in the acquisition deal. In the next 
section, we develop the argument that the choice of post-acquisition integration 
strategy is shaped by the extent to which the acquired firm is involved in strategic 
alliances and that this effect is contingent on the existence of acquisition-preceding 
relations between the acquiring and acquired firms.  
4.3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
4.3.1. Number of Inherited Alliances  
When a firm acquires another firm that is not engaged in strategic alliances, it can 
focus its efforts on the integration of the acquired firm and the in-house resources 
and capabilities that are concentrated within its boundaries. In addition, the 
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acquiring firm has to cross only one interface (i.e., the acquired firm) to access 
those resources and capabilities (see Figure 4.1A. for an illustration).  
Figure 4.1A. Acquired firm’s resource distribution and number of interfaces 
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However, some firms are engaged in alliances when they are acquired. The 
acquiring firm consequently inherits these alliances (Li et al., 2017; Oleksiak, 
Faems, & de Faria, 2016). Firms that have collaboration agreements with other 
firms have resources embedded not only within their organizational boundaries 
but also in their strategic alliances. With each additional inherited alliance, the 
dispersion of valuable resources increases, which results in fewer value-creation 
opportunities. This is because the acquiring firm will struggle to identify the 
resources (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Koruna, 2004), which in turn makes it more 
challenging to move and use the knowledge elements (Galunic & Rodan, 1998) that 
are embedded in a particular alliance.  
The presence of inherited alliances also implies that the acquiring firm will 
need to cross more interfaces to access all resources (see Figure 4.1B. for an 
illustration). In order to coordinate these interfaces, the acquiring firm will most 
likely want to implement its own collaborative routines, which implies a disruption 
of the collaboration routines established between the acquired firm and its alliance 
partners. Moreover, the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance partners may 
have conflicting views regarding the management of the alliance (Jiang, Tao, & 
Santoro, 2010; Parise & Casher, 2003; Wassmer, 2010). The more interfaces the 
acquiring firm has to cross, the more likely conflicts become and, consequently, the 




Figure 4.1B. Acquired firm’s resource distribution and number of interfaces 


















When there are numerous inherited alliances in an acquisition, the 
acquiring firm will most likely find it more difficult to identify critical and valuable 
know-how and to effectively manage the inherited collaborative efforts. The 
transfer of knowledge elements in such acquisitions and their recombination will 
be more burdensome (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Grant, 1996; Karim, 2012), and 
there is likely to be greater potential for conflict (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002). Therefore, the post-acquisition integration of an acquired firm with 
numerous alliances is more complicated than the integration of an acquired firm 
without alliances. Due to higher resource dispersion, we expect the acquiring firm 
to have fewer value-creation opportunities. At the same time, we expect the 
presence of more interfaces to trigger more value-disruption risks. As such, the 
acquiring firm is less likely to be able to internalize and coordinate the acquired 
firm’s resources. The acquiring firm will instead focus on avoiding the value-
disruption risks and, therefore, choose a preservation strategy rather than an 
absorption integration.  
In summary, we predict that as the number of inherited alliances increases, 
the resource dispersion and the number of interfaces also increase, triggering fewer 
value-creation opportunities and more value-disruption risks, respectively. Hence, 
the acquiring firm will be more likely to choose to preserve the acquired firm. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of inherited alliances in an 
acquisition, the more likely the acquiring firm is to 
structurally preserve the acquired firm. 
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4.3.2. The Moderating Effect of Prior Alliances with the Acquired Firm  
The literature at the intersection of alliances and acquisitions shows that while 
some firms acquire organizations with which they are unacquainted, others acquire 
alliance partners (Garette & Dussauge, 2000; Zaheer, Hernandez & Banerjee, 
2010). When the acquiring firm has been involved in an alliance with the acquired 
firm, the acquirer has been a part of the acquired firm’s collection of alliances 
(Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004; Zaheer et al., 2010). Consequently, it has had an 
opportunity to learn about and familiarize itself with the acquired firm’s inter-firm 
collaboration routines (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). In other words, it should have 
an understanding of how the acquired firm has assimilated, exchanged, and 
(re)combined knowledge, capabilities, and skills with the inherited alliance 
partners. Therefore, the acquiring firm should be better able to approach the 
inherited alliances in a manner similar to that of the acquired firm. Moreover, the 
acquirer should be better able to spot value-creation opportunities and to address 
the value-disruption risks in the acquired firm’s alliances. 
Given the familiarity advantages of prior ties, we expect the relationship 
between the number of inherited alliances and the choice of an integration strategy 
to depend on the presence of an acquisition-preceding relationship between the 
acquiring firm and the acquired firm. More specifically, when the acquired firm has 
numerous alliances but the acquiring firm has an acquisition-preceding relation 
with the acquired firm, the acquirer should be more capable of identifying and 
recombining resources residing in the acquired firm’s alliances. Consequently, the 
acquiring firm should more easily see the value-creation opportunities (Zaheer et 
al., 2010). In addition, through the pre-acquisition relationship, the acquiring firm 
should have learned about the collaboration routines the acquired firm applied 
when working with alliance partners (Grant & Baden-Fueller, 2004; Zollo et al., 
2002). Both the acquirer and the inherited alliance partners may have similar 
collaboration routines because they have been part of the acquired firm’s alliance 
activities. As a result, we expect the acquiring firm to have a better understanding 
of how to effectively approach and avoid potential conflicts, even across multiple 
interfaces, which in turn should help it reduce the value-disruption risks. For these 
reasons, we expect the acquiring firm to be more inclined to implement a structural 
absorption strategy.  
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In summary, given that acquisitions of prior alliance partners are likely to 
significantly reduce the potential for problems associated with resource 
identification and changes in collaboration routines, we propose that an acquired 
firm with a higher number of alliances is less likely to be preserved when the 
acquisition is preceded by an alliance with the acquired firm. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of the increasing number of inherited 
alliances on the choice of preservation strategy is less 
outspoken when the acquiring firm and the acquired firm 
have been involved in an acquisition-preceding alliance.  
4.4. METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1. Sample and Data 
In line with previous studies, we considered acquisitions in which the acquiring 
firm purchased a majority stake in the target firm and gained control over it 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Zaheer 
et al., 2010; Zaheer et al., 2013). To test our hypotheses, we chose the biotechnology 
industry. Both acquisitions and alliances are frequent phenomena in this sector 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002), making acquisitions in which inherited alliances 
are present more likely. We selected the 50 largest publicly listed biotechnology 
firms (based on revenue in 2004) that pursued one acquisition or more between 
1996 and 2010. We chose this sampling approach and time window due to the 
continuous presence of the firms on the market and the availability of useful public 
information on acquisitions. Our data-collection efforts resulted in the 
identification of 107 acquisitions by 32 acquirers. However, data were unavailable 
for some acquisitions, which reduced our sample to 100 acquisitions by 32 
acquirers. Of these 100 acquisitions, 66 included inherited alliances and 34 did not. 
This suggests that the phenomenon of inherited alliances was present in the 
majority of these acquisition deals. 
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4.4.2. Data Sources 
We identified acquisitions using the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database and 
validated this information using annual reports, SEC 10-K/20-F filings, and 
acquisition statements (when available, e.g., SEC 8-K filings). After we extracted 
the information on acquisitions, we identified those acquisitions involving 
inherited alliances. To do so, we used press releases from the LexisNexis database 
and information included in annual reports, including SEC 10-K filings, SEC 20-F 
filings, and SEC 8-K acquisition statements (when available). Using the same 
sources, we followed the alliance activities of the acquiring and acquired firms to 
determine whether they had been involved in acquisition-preceding relationships.  
 We used Harvard’s Patent Network Dataverse to collect information on the 
classes in which the firms patented, which allowed us to calculate the technological 
relatedness of the acquirer and the acquired firm. Furthermore, we obtained such 
information as SIC codes, number of employees, year of incorporation, and 
whether an acquisition was a cross-border one from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis 
database and the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. Finally, the annual 
statements provided us with data regarding the acquirer’s R&D intensity.  
4.4.3. Measures 
Dependent Variable 
We determined the post-acquisition integration strategy—absorption or 
preservation—using press releases in the LexisNexis database. We also checked 
whether the acquired firm was continuously traceable under its own name 
(Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2006; 2009). Simultaneously, we consulted 
annual reports and SEC 8-K acquisition statements to see if the acquired firm was 
reported as functioning as a distinct operational unit after the acquisition. In this 
step, we looked at each acquired firm’s status as a wholly-owned subsidiary or a 
separate unit or division (Parurchuri et al., 2006) in order to account for firms that 
might have changed names for legal purposes, such as clinical trials, even though 
their operations remained autonomous. More precisely, if the acquired firm was 
listed under its own name in press releases a year after the acquisition or if the 
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acquired firm changed its name but functioned as a distinct operational unit, we 
treated it as preserved (structural preservation = 1). Finally, if the acquired firm 
was no longer traceable as a distinct organizational entity in either the press 
releases or company statements, we assumed that it had been structurally absorbed 
(structural preservation = 0). Of all acquisitions in our sample, 65% fell into the 
preservation category and 35% fell into the absorption category. 
Independent Variable 
In line with alliance portfolio research (e.g., Phelps, 2010; Asgari, Singh, & 
Mitchell, 2017), we operationalized the number of inherited alliances as the sum of 
all alliances that were inherited by the focal firm via a particular acquisition.  
Moderator 
We coded the existence of an acquisition-preceding collaboration between the 
acquirer and acquired firm (Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010) as 1. All other 
cases were coded 0. 
Control Variables 
We controlled for several alternative factors that could have an impact on the 
acquiring firm’s post-acquisition integration choices. We followed prior research 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002) in accounting for similarities in the size of 
acquisition subjects. We measured size using the number of employees in the year 
before the acquisition, and we divided the size of the acquiring firm by the size of 
the acquired firm. In order to correct for the small number of large companies, we 
considered the natural logarithm for both the acquiring and acquired firms’ 
number of employees. As the acquiring firm was the larger of the two firms in all 
cases, a lower ratio implies more similarity in size.  
Furthermore, we controlled for the technological overlap between the 
acquiring firm and the acquired firm. In line with previous research (see, e.g., Jaffe, 
1986; Puranam et al., 2009), we measured the extent to which the two firms 
patented in the same technology classes in the three years prior to the acquisition. 
This measure allowed us to capture the relative technological position of the 
acquiring and acquired firms (Puranam et al., 2009). In order to construct this 
variable, we measured the distribution of patents across patent classifications. This 
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represents the number of patents assigned to partner firm i in patent class s. 
Technological relatedness can vary from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect overlap in 
the firms’ technological bases. The formula for technological overlap is denoted as 




 We also controlled for market overlap using Standard Industry 
Classification codes. We coded this variable 1 if the acquiring and acquired firms 
operated in exactly the same industry (the same 4 digits) and 0 otherwise 
(Puranam et al., 2009).  
 We also included several acquirer and target characteristics, such as: 
acquirer’s and target’s age at the time of the acquisition (in years), acquirer’s R&D 
intensity in the acquisition year, and acquirer’s acquisition experience (a count of 
the acquisitions pursued by the acquirer in the three years prior to the acquisition). 
Lastly, we included a dummy variable indicating whether an acquisition was a 
cross-border takeover.  
4.4.4. Analytical Approach 
We follow previous research on post-acquisition integration strategies (e.g., 
Puranam et al., 2009) in which the post-acquisition integration strategy was 
measured using a dichotomous variable. We apply a logistic regression approach 
with clustered standard errors (by acquirer) and controls for year effects to account 
for any macroeconomic changes and industry-wide shocks.  
4.5. RESULTS 
In Table 4.1., we provide an overview of the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
We observe that the acquiring firms applied the preservation strategy in 65% of all 
acquisitions and the absorption strategy in the other 35%. The mean number of 
inherited alliances in acquisitions involving such alliances is 3.41 (for the entire 
sample, the mean is 2.25). In 18% of the cases, the acquirers had an alliance with 
the acquired firm prior to the acquisition.  
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The results indicate that pairwise correlations are sufficiently low to rule 
out multicollinearity concerns. We also ran tests to check whether the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) fell below the common thresholds of 5 and 10, which would 
point to multicollinearity issues (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Kleinbaum, 
Kupper, & Muller, 1988). The mean VIF was 1.17, with the highest value equal to 
1.34 (acquirer’s acquisition experience). This provides further evidence that there 
is no multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Preservation strategy 0.65 0.48 1.00 
          
Number of inherited alliances 2.25   3.40 0.10 1.00 
         
Prior tie between acquiring and 
acquired firm (dummy) 
 0.18   0.39 -0.20 0.09 1.00 
        
Similarity of size between acquiring 
and acquired firm (ln ratio) 
 1.83  0.82 -0.10 -0.25 -0.03 1.00 
       
Technological relatedness between 
acquiring and acquired firm 
 0.15  0.33 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 1.00 
      
Market overlap between acquiring 
and acquired firm 
 0.37  0.49 -0.09 0.11 0.18 -0.09 0.01 1.00 
     
Target age (in years)  2.32  1.64 -0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.36 -0.00 -0.24 1.00 
    
Acquirer age (in years) 12.46 16.27 0.11 -0.07 0.03 -0.14 0.17 -0.09 0.07 1.00 
   
Acquirer’s R&D intensity  20.77 16.71 0.16 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 0.22 0.05 0.09 1.00 
  
Acquirer acquisition experience (in 
years) 
  6.85 56.84 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 1.00 
 
Cross-border acquisition (dummy)  2.32  1.64 -0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.36 -0.00 -0.24 1.00 0.07 0.05 -0.09 1.00 
Note. N=100. Mean VIF=1.17, with a highest VIF of 1.34 for the acquirer’s acquisition experience. 
Table 4.2. presents the results of the stepwise logistic regression analysis 
in which we analyzed the antecedents of post-acquisition integration choices. 
Model 1 is the baseline model and includes only the control variables. In Model 2, 
we test Hypothesis 1. In Model 3, we add the moderator, while in Model 4 we 
include the independent and moderator variables. Finally, Model 5 includes the 






Table 4.2. Logistic regression results. DV: Post-acquisition integration strategy 
                              (=1 if preserved; =0 if absorbed) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Observations 100 100 100 100 100 
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.087 0.097 0.109 0.117 
Log lik. -59.720 -59.134 -58.444 -57.701 -57.182 
Chi-squared 16.622* 22.510** 24.450** 31.326*** 43.322*** 
Note. All regressions were estimated using clustered (robust) standard errors, which are reported in parentheses.  The 
significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include a set of year dummies, which are not 
reported for brevity. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the higher the number of inherited alliances in 
an acquisition, the more likely it becomes that the acquired firm will be structurally 
preserved. The coefficient for the number of inherited alliances is positive and 
significant, which supports Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 posits that the effect of the 
number of inherited alliances on the post-acquisition integration strategy depends 
on whether the acquiring and acquired firms were involved in an acquisition-
preceding relation. The coefficient for the interaction effect is negative and 
significant, which implies that when the acquired firm has higher numbers of 
alliances and, at the same time, the acquiring and acquired firms collaborated prior 
to the acquisition, structural preservation becomes less likely (Figure 4.2). In such 
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cases, the acquiring firm is more likely to structurally absorb the acquired firm, 
which lends support to Hypothesis 2. 
 






With respect to the control variables, our results indicate that in the 
presence of a market overlap between the acquiring and acquired firm, the 
acquiring firm is less likely to preserve the acquired entity (see Models 1 and 2). 
This is in line with prior acquisition studies, which show that when there is high 
level of substitutability in, for example, the market domain, the acquiring firm can 
more easily achieve synergies, such as cost bundling and redundancy reduction, 
leading to economies of scale and scope (e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Capron, 1999; Colombo 
& Rabiossi, 2014). We also find that the older an acquirer is, the more likely it is to 
preserve the acquired firm. This might be because mature firms find it more 
difficult to implement changes in their established structures (Boeker, 1997). 
Therefore, it might be easier for them to keep acquired units separate than to trying 
to fold them into their organizational boundaries. We do not find significant results 
for the remaining control variables. 
We conducted several additional analyses to check the consistency of the 
results. First, we estimated our models with a different time window (five years) 











































has been widely applied in the strategic management literature (e.g., Reuer & 
Devarakonda, 2018; Sampson, 2007). The results were in line with our main 
results. Second, we added a control variable—amount paid per employee in the 
acquired firm (in USD). This is an important variable, as the cost of the acquisition 
may affect the acquirer’s financial position and, consequently, its readiness to make 
certain investments and structural decisions following the acquisition. The 
inclusion of this variable reduced our sample size to 96, as some of the acquiring 
firms did not disclosed the deal value in the public announcement. Nevertheless, 
our results remained unchanged. 
4.6. DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to examine the post-acquisition strategic integration 
choices made by acquiring firms. In particular, we looked at whether the inter-
organizational collaborations in which an acquired firm is involved influence the 
acquiring firm’s decisions regarding the post-acquisition organizational structure. 
We also investigated a condition—an acquisition-preceding alliance between the 
acquirer and the acquired firm—under which the acquiring firm can deal more 
effectively with the resources that are dispersed across the inherited alliances and 
multiple interfaces, and the related value-disruption risks.  
Our analysis of a sample of acquisitions pursued by biotechnology firms 
demonstrated that the larger the number of inherited alliances, the greater the 
probability that the acquirer will preserve the acquired firm. We also found that the 
positive effect of the number of inherited alliances on the choice of preservation 
strategy is less prominent when the acquiring and acquired firm were involved in 
an alliance prior to the acquisition. In the following, we discuss the core insights of 
this study and their contributions to the alliance literature and acquisition 
research, especially the stream on post-acquisition integration strategies. 
4.6.1. Implications for the Acquisition and Alliance Literature 
While absorption of an acquired firm may offer numerous value-creation 
opportunities, it might also negatively affect the acquired firm’s value (Puranam et 
al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Consequently, acquiring firms often face a 
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dilemma when deciding between coordination and autonomy (Puranam et al., 
2006; Puranam et al., 2009), and whether to absorb or preserve the acquired firm. 
With the exception of a few studies (e.g., Puranam et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2013), 
scholars have paid little attention to the drivers of post-acquisition integration 
decisions. In order to better understand the coordination-autonomy dilemma and 
its consequences for integration decisions, scholars have called for more nuanced 
investigations of the determinants of this decision (Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & 
Vaara, 2017). We respond to this call by departing from the focus on the acquired 
firm’s in-house resources and capabilities and acknowledging that the inter-
organizational relations (i.e., inherited alliances) in which the shared resources and 
capabilities of the acquired firm are embedded may play a role in the acquiring 
firm’s choice of integration strategy. The distinction between in-house and shared 
resources and capabilities allows us to highlight the fact that resources and 
capabilities are not always concentrated in the acquired firm—they can also be 
dispersed across its alliance partners, which implies the presence of more 
interfaces. Thus, the conceptual distinction between resources within and outside 
the acquired firm’s boundaries advances our understanding of why there may be 
fewer value-creation opportunities in some acquisitions as well as the potential 
sources of value-disruption risks in acquisitions.  
Our study is one of the few to attempts to study the relationship between 
resource dispersion (Galunic & Rodan, 1998) and integration choices. We argue 
that given the higher level of resource dispersion inherent in acquisitions that 
involve numerous inherited alliances, the benefits of autonomy outweigh the costs 
of disruption associated with the coordination approach. Resource dispersion 
explains why acquirers may choose to preserve the acquired firm despite the value-
creation opportunities that come with the acquisition. In addition, our study 
provides insights into a condition under which the dispersion of resources across 
the acquired firm, the accompanying inherited alliances, and the multiple 
interfaces may be managed without adopting a preservation strategy. In other 
words, we offer insights into a condition that allows for more value-creation 
opportunities and softens the potential disruption risks associated with higher 
resource dispersion and an increased number of interfaces. An acquisition-
preceding relationship with the acquired firm creates organizational circumstances 
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in which tight coordination is less disruptive. The shared understanding of the 
acquired firm’s collaboration routines serves as a powerful mechanism that helps 
to reduce the disruption risks and allows for a focus on value-creation 
opportunities (Zaheer et al., 2010).  
Our study also contributes to alliance research. The extant alliance 
literature offers rich insights into how firms can create value from their alliances 
(see Das & Teng, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 2010). This research shows that 
inter-firm collaborations often help firms expand their knowledge and resource 
repositories, which may ultimately translate into better innovation and financial 
performance (e.g., Bos, Faems, & Noseleit, 2017; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; 
Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013). Our study adds to this body of literature by showing 
that alliances should not be considered separately from acquisitions, as 
interdependencies may exist between the two. In particular, we observe 
interdependencies with respect to strategic decisions regarding the organizational 
structure of the firm. In that sense, we show that alliance implications extend 
beyond the firm’s outcomes to its strategic business decisions. Alliances seem to 
influence not only a firm’s performance but also its activities. Therefore, we 
encourage scholars to join this emerging research stream, which connects alliances 
and acquisitions, and to investigate other types of decisions that may be affected by 
the presence of inherited alliances in acquisitions. For example, studies of how 
inherited alliances influence the acquiring firm’s alliance formation/termination 
behavior and the boundary conditions of that effect are likely to be promising. 
Whereas quantitative studies could offer interesting insights, process research 
might also be helpful for identifying the precise mechanisms behind these 
decisions.  
4.6.2. Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This study has several limitations, which provide an interesting starting point for 
future research. First, we examined the impact of inherited alliances on the post-
acquisition management of acquired firms in the biotechnology sector. While we 
expect our findings to be applicable to other knowledge-intensive settings, we call 
for additional research that tests the generalizability of our results. Second, our 
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sample size did not allow us to delve deeper into more nuanced aspects of the 
inherited alliances that may have an acquisition-level impact. For example, future 
research could explore the pre-acquisition knowledge flows between the acquiring 
firm and the inherited alliance partner to investigate whether partner-specific 
absorptive capacity plays a role in post-acquisition integration choices. Finally, we 
followed previous empirical studies that used secondary data to operationalize the 
post-acquisition integration strategy. Moreover, in line with other research, we 
considered the two dimensions of post-acquisition integration (absorption and 
preservation). However, in practice, this choice may not be clear. We therefore 
encourage scholars to develop a more nuanced measure of post-acquisition 
integration strategy that can capture different levels of absorption and 
preservation. Similarly, it could be interesting to use a longitudinal investigation to 
examine the extent to which the integration processes occurs sequentially and 
when the impact of inherited alliances is the strongest.  
4.7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examined the implications of inherited alliances for the 
integration of acquired firms. Based on the acquisition and alliance literature, we 
argued that a higher number of inherited alliances in an acquisition increases the 
likelihood that the acquiring firm will preserve the acquired firm. We also theorized 
that this effect will be attenuated in the presence of an alliance tie between the 
acquiring firm and the acquired firm prior to the acquisition. Our empirical 
analysis supports our hypothesis that a higher number of inherited alliances is 
positively related to the choice of a preservation strategy. In addition, we find that 
the existence of an acquisition-preceding relationship between the acquiring and 
acquired firm softens this effect, making absorption the more likely choice. Thus, 
by highlighting the role of inherited alliances in acquisitions, our study offers new 
insights into the dilemma of the choice between coordination (value-creation 











The core objective of this dissertation was to study the phenomenon of inherited 
alliances, its nature, and its implications. In pursuit of this objective, I conducted 
three empirical studies in the biotechnology industry. In this final chapter, I start 
by outlining the main findings. Subsequently, I elaborate on how these studies of 
inherited alliances change our understanding of alliances and acquisitions. 
Thereafter, I explain the methodological contributions and the practical 
implications of these studies. I end the chapter with a general conclusion.  
5.1. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
In Chapter 2, I explored the role of inherited alliances and their implications for 
firm performance. The qualitative findings indicated that inherited alliances differ 
substantially from homegrown partnerships, and that they can create both 
managerial challenges and capability-building opportunities. By quantitatively 
testing these insights, I found that inherited alliances positively influence firm 
performance, which implies that the capability-building opportunities outweigh 
the managerial challenges associated with this kind of alliance. This effect was 
particularly pronounced for explorative inherited alliances. 
 In Chapter 3, I studied the resilience of alliances to the acquisition of an 
alliance partner by a third firm. I argued that the acquired firm can navigate the 
information asymmetries between the acquiring firm and the inherited alliance 
partner as well as coordination challenges, which enhances the resilience of 
inherited alliances. Moreover, I identified conditions that can shape this navigating 
ability, and provided evidence that inherited alliances exhibit more resilience when 
the acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner have extensive partner-specific 
 100 
 
experience within joint alliances, and when the acquiring firm preserves the 
acquired firm after the acquisition. 
 In Chapter 4, I examined the post-acquisition governance implications of 
inherited alliances. From the acquisition perspective, I argued that when deciding 
whether to absorb or preserve an acquired firm, the acquiring firm should look 
beyond the resources and capabilities located within the organizational boundaries 
of the acquired firm. In other words, acquiring firms should consider the strategic 
alliances in which the acquired firm is engaged. I found that as the number of 
inherited alliances increases, the likelihood of applying preservation strategy rises. 
In addition, I demonstrated that this positive effect becomes less pronounced (i.e., 
a higher likelihood of absorption) when the acquiring firm and the acquired firm 
had an acquisition-preceding alliance. 
5.2. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this dissertation, I undertook three studies in which I went beyond the 
traditional scope of alliance (portfolio) and acquisition research. In the following, 
I discuss the broader theoretical contributions this dissertation makes by looking 
at alliances in the context of acquisitions. First, I outline the contributions to 
alliance research. Second, I discuss the contributions to acquisition research. I also 
identify challenges and opportunities in these streams of literature that could be 
addressed in future research. 
5.2.1. Contributions to Alliance Research 
This dissertation makes two main contributions to alliance research. First, the 
extant alliance research examines why firms engage in alliances and provides rich 
insights into how firms can create value from their partnerships (Jiang, Tao, & 
Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 2007; Sampson, 2007). However, both conceptually and 
empirically, these studies largely assume that engagement in alliances is a 
consequence of a rational strategic process and that the firms involved in an 
alliance are its initiators (Wassmer, 2010). Throughout this dissertation, I have 
demonstrated that these assumptions limit our understanding of alliances, as firms 
can also gain access to alliances through acquisitions. Consequently, when 
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theorizing about the phenomenon of inherited alliances, I shifted the theoretical 
lens towards the different alliance origins. From the focal firm’s perspective, I 
developed novel theoretical arguments regarding the unique characteristics, 
liabilities, and benefits of inherited alliances that differentiate them from 
homegrown alliances. My findings show that the benefits of inherited alliances 
outweigh their liabilities. As such, these alliances can be of great value to firms 
(Chapter 2). Therefore, the distinctions among the different alliance origins are 
important for enhancing our theoretical understanding of how and when firms can 
effectively benefit from their alliances and alliance portfolios. I encourage alliance 
scholars to apply a similar research approach and delve even deeper into the 
implications of inherited alliances. For example, future research could model 
alliance portfolio configurations following acquisitions involving inherited 
alliances. More specifically, the issue of whether inherited alliances create new 
collaboration opportunities or destroy existing homegrown alliances would be a 
promising area for future research. 
 Second, research into alliance dynamics highlights that alliances are not 
static but change over time. In the current debate, scholars have identified partner 
changes in alliances that occur due to particular internal alliance needs or 
dysfunctions (e.g., Bakker, 2016; Lavie & Singh, 2011). I contribute to this stream 
by pointing to a different type of partner change that is not motivated by either 
internal alliance needs or dysfunctions but occurs due to the acquisition of an 
alliance partner by a third firm (Chapter 3). In other words, by studying alliance 
partners’ acquisitions, I demonstrate that alliance partner reconfiguration does not 
always originate from within an alliance. The theoretical concepts of information 
asymmetries and coordination considerations help explain how a change in 
alliance partner ownership can be a source of instability and how it can be managed 
to keep an alliance resilient. A valuable recommendation for future research would 
be to explore other potential, external triggers that can cause instability in an 
alliance and to investigate how they can be managed to help an alliance recover. 
For example, researchers may wish to analyze the extent to which a patent litigation 
case or a corporate scandal in which one of the partners is involved affects an 
alliance and how the consequences can be attenuated.  
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5.2.2. Contributions to Acquisition Research 
My dissertation contributes to the acquisition literature in three ways. First, 
previous acquisition research acknowledges that acquisitions have significant 
consequences for the acquiring and acquired firms’ operations (Capron, 1999; 
Paruchuri et al., 2006). I contribute to this stream of literature by highlighting that 
acquisitions can have consequences beyond those considered in the extant 
research. More precisely, in Chapter 3, I rely on the theoretical concepts of 
information asymmetry and coordination considerations to explain why and how 
an acquisition can threaten an alliance in which the acquired firm is engaged. While 
I explored the perspectives of the acquiring firm (Chapter 2) and the inherited 
alliance (Chapter 3), future research could examine the perspective of the inherited 
alliance partner. This would provide a complete picture of the consequences of an 
alliance partner’s acquisition. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate 
the consequences (e.g., changes in performance and/or strategy) of an alliance 
partner’s acquisition for the acquired firm’s alliance partners.  
Second, the extant acquisition literature has traditionally viewed the 
acquired firm as a passive actor in an acquisition. Although some scholars have 
noted that the acquired firm can play a more active managerial role in the post-
acquisition process, this issue remains underexplored (Colman & Lunnan, 2011; 
Graebner, 2004; Heimeriks & Graebner, 2014; Meyer & Lieb‐Dóczy, 2003). I 
contribute to this research by highlighting that, under certain conditions, the 
acquired firm may help reduce the information asymmetries and coordination 
considerations associated with inherited alliances by navigating these challenges 
through knowledge brokering and relational mediation (Chapter 3). Moreover, we 
learn from Chapter 2 that inherited alliances improve the focal firm’s performance. 
This finding is promising, as it shows how acquiring firms can enhance the 
resilience of inherited alliances and, thus, ensure continued access to them. 
Consequently, I invite scholars to adopt an even deeper level of analysis to reveal 
more details regarding how an acquired firm executes its knowledge broker and 
relational mediator roles. Future research could complement the quantitative 
approach used in this dissertation with insights from qualitative data. Case-study 
research investigating the perspectives of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and 
 103 
 
the inherited alliance partner may provide interesting insights into which of the 
acquired firm’s practices (e.g., formal versus informal) are most advantageous for 
the future of an inherited alliance. On a more general level, future research should 
explicitly consider the acquired firm as an active entity in order to develop a more 
complete understanding of post-acquisition dynamics. 
Third, acquisition scholars have extensively studied why firms acquire a 
particular firm, and how they can transfer the acquired resources and recombine 
them with their own resources (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Anand & Delios, 2002; 
Capron & Hulland, 1999; Chondrakis, 2016; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). At the 
same time, in their theorizing, acquisition scholars have only considered the 
acquired firm as a potential resource-access point. As a result, we have a limited 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms in the identification of the acquired 
firm’s resources and their combination with those of the acquiring firm. As it shifts 
our attention towards inherited alliances, this dissertation shows that the acquired 
firm may also have resources outside its internal boundaries (i.e., in its alliances). 
In addition, I identify a facilitator that influences the acquiring firm’s ability to 
effectively manage the value-creating opportunities and reduce the value-
disrupting risks associated with inherited alliances (Chapter 4). Consequently, I 
encourage future studies on acquisitions to account for those attributes of acquired 
firms that are located outside their boundaries in their theoretical and empirical 
frameworks. 
5.3. METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
This dissertation goes beyond the well-established usage of the SDC Platinum Joint 
Ventures & Alliances database to identify firm’s alliance activities. The SDC 
Platinum Joint Ventures & Alliances database underrepresents the total number of 
alliances (Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Schilling, 2009). To understand 
the scale of the problem, I collected information regarding alliances in the SDC 
Platinum Joint Ventures & Alliances database for several biotechnology firms and 
I did the same using the press releases found in the LexisNexis database. For the 
period from 1996 to 2010, I was able to identify all alliances that were mentioned 
in the SDC database in the press releases from the LexisNexis database. However, 
 104 
 
the alliances that were included in the SDC database constituted only 20% of all 
alliances that I was able to identify in the press releases. In my attempt to collect 
the most complete information possible with regard to both homegrown and 
inherited alliances, I examined approximately 70,000 news articles in the 
LexisNexis database. I followed existing guidelines on collecting alliance data using 
press releases (Ahuja, 2001; Hashai et al., 2018; Phelps, 2010).  
 Furthermore, I followed the lifecycle of each alliance, which allowed me to 
collect information on their start dates and to estimate their termination dates as 
precisely as possible. Typically, alliance researchers assume that each alliance lasts 
a fixed number of years. Usually, they apply a time window of two to five years (e.g., 
Bos et al., 2017; Sampson, 2007; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Given my research 
goals, it was essential to collect information on alliance duration—I could not have 
derived key insights if I had relied on the alliance duration assumptions. In my 
dataset, some alliances lasted only a few months, while others lasted for up to 17 
years. This wide lifespan also highlights the importance of considering alliance 
duration when looking at alliances and alliance portfolios.  
 Finally, my extensive data-collection efforts allowed me to distinguish 
among the different origins of alliances. The SDC Platinum database does not link 
the inherited alliances to the acquiring firm. This is because the SDC database 
provides information on alliance start dates but it does not follow those alliances 
over time. Although we could look at the acquired firm’s name and link it to the 
acquiring firm, doing so would be insufficient because as this database registers 
only alliance formations and does not follow alliances over their lifecycle, it 
provides no information on whether an alliance that the acquired firm formed prior 
to the acquisition was still active at the moment of the acquisition and thereafter. 
Consequently, my approach is useful not only for the precise identification of 
alliances and alliance portfolios but also for the identification of the acquired firm’s 
inter-firm embedded resources and capabilities. Therefore, I strongly believe that 
using press releases to identify firms’ alliance activities is a promising data-
collection method that can help us better understand acquisitions, alliances, 
alliance portfolios, and their dynamics. 
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5.4. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to the research and empirical contributions, this dissertation has 
practical implications for corporate-development managers and alliance 
executives. First, I develop a more complete perspective for corporate-development 
managers on what acquisitions can entail. By studying the role and implications of 
inherited alliances, I identified their challenges and opportunities. I showed that 
inherited alliances can improve firm performance (Chapter 2), as they can help 
acquiring firms reshape and improve their organizational capabilities. This insight 
may help corporate development managers as they attempt to understand where 
sources of additional value might reside in an acquisition. In addition, I found that 
acquired firms can play an active role in the post-acquisition management of 
inherited alliances (Chapter 3). Given these insights, I encourage corporate-
development managers to look beyond the internal attributes of an acquisition 
target and apply network-based due diligence. This will allow firms to prepare to 
not only manage all of the risks an acquisition entails but also seize all of the 
opportunities it offers. 
 Finally, my findings provide guidance for heads of alliance management 
and alliance managers. I demonstrated that alliances can have different origins, 
and that an acquiring firm’s alliance portfolio can consist of both homegrown and 
inherited alliances. I also showed that inherited alliances can be of value to the 
acquiring firm (Chapter 2). Based on these insights, I encourage alliance executives 
to keep track of the entire firm’s alliance portfolio, as doing so may help them 
stimulate value creation from the alliances. On a more general level, I hope that 
this dissertation helps managers maximize the value from and optimize the 






5.6. FINAL THOUGHTS 
In this dissertation, I have shown the importance of looking beyond the internal 
boundaries of acquired firms, as alliances can be intertwined in acquisitions. My 
research makes an interesting contribution to the extant alliance and acquisition 
research, as it explores the phenomenon of inherited alliances. In Chapter 2, I 
explained the nature of inherited alliances and I developed new knowledge on how 
inherited alliances provide capability-building opportunities that ultimately 
improve the firm’s performance. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, I demonstrated that 
specific conditions shape the acquired firm’s ability to attenuate the challenges 
posed by inherited alliances and improve the resilience of those alliances to an 
alliance partner’s acquisition. Finally, in Chapter 4, I delved into the impact of 
inherited alliances for the post-acquisition governance choices of the acquiring 
firm and found that they play an important role in integration decisions.  
I believe that the ideas and findings presented in this dissertation are 
thought provoking and I hope they will encourage other scholars to conduct studies 
on inherited alliances. I am also optimistic that the evidence found in this 
dissertation will motivate practitioners to plan and execute network-based due 
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In order to complement and supplement internal resources and capabilities, firms 
form strategic alliances with other organizations and purchase other organizations. 
While traditionally research has looked at strategic alliances and acquisitions 
separately, strategic alliances can often be intertwined in the acquisition deals. 
Specifically, when a firm acquires another firm, it may be confronted with the 
alliance agreements of the acquired firm. In my dissertation, I refer to this specific 
type of an alliance as inherited alliance—the strategic partnership of an acquired 
firm that an acquiring firm inherits through an acquisition. By studying inherited 
alliances, we are able to gain important insights into these alliances and provide a 
better understanding of the unique characteristics that make the inherited alliances 
different from the homegrown alliances. The core objective of this dissertation is 
therefore to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of inherited alliances, 
creating new insights about the origins of alliances and thereof implications. To 
address this core research objective, I conducted three empirical studies on 
inherited alliances, using practitioners’ insights as well as rich secondary data from 
the biotechnology industry. 
In the first project, I firstly explore the phenomenon of inherited alliances 
by conducting interviews with biotechnology executives. The field evidence shows 
that i) inherited alliances differ from homegrown alliances substantially, ii) 
inherited alliances can both bring along unique challenges and opportunities, and 
iii) these challenges and opportunities may differ depending on the type of the 
alliance itself. Relying on the insights from the conducted interviews, I test the 
impact of the inherited alliances in a firm’s alliance portfolio on firm financial 
performance. Using a panel dataset including alliance activities of 39 top 
biotechnology firms, I find that the inherited alliances, especially the one of 
explorative nature, positively influence the firm financial performance. With 
respect to contributions, the findings highlight the importance of distinguishing 
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between different origins of alliances as their impact differs. This study also shows 
that in order to adequately evaluate the implications of acquisitions, it is not 
enough to take an atomistic perspective. Instead, it is important to acknowledge 
that the acquired firms might be embedded in a broader network which can also 
affect the acquiring firm performance. 
In the second project, I study the navigating role of the acquired firm in the 
resilience of an alliance to an alliance partner acquisition. I argue that the inherited 
alliances pose two core challenges to the acquiring firm: informational asymmetry 
and coordination problems. In this study, I also argue that the acquired firm can 
help navigate these challenges by playing a knowledge broker and relational 
mediator roles. I test four conditions under which the acquired firm is likely to 
improve the inherited alliance’s resilience to an alliance partner acquisition. Based 
on a quantitative analysis of 213 inherited alliances, I find support for two 
hypothesis. Specifically, the pre-acquisition alliance duration and the preservation 
integration strategy make an inherited alliance more likely to be resilient. I found 
no support for neither the impact of the technological relatedness nor prior alliance 
ties between the acquired firm and the inherited alliance partner. The results imply 
that the partner-specific experience within an alliance and preservation of the 
acquired firm help the inherited alliance to withstand and recover from the alliance 
partner acquisition. In terms of contributions, this study points to the active role 
the acquired firm can play in the inherited alliance resilience after an acquisition. 
In the third and final project, I focus on the role of the inherited alliances 
in the post-acquisition integration choices and the moderating effect of the prior 
alliance tie between the acquiring and acquired firm. Based on the insights from 
the alliance and acquisition literatures I develop hypotheses and test them relying 
on 100 acquisition deals in biotechnology industry. I argue that when there are 
more inherited alliances in an acquisition, there is a greater resource dispersion 
and a higher number of interfaces to cross to access these resources. In 
consequence, the acquiring firm is more likely to preserve the acquired firm. I also 
provide theoretical argumentation that when the acquiring and acquired firm had 
an alliance-preceding alliance, the acquirer has had the opportunity to learn how 
the acquired firm collaborates and thus has built an understanding of how it should 
deal with the acquired firm’s alliances. As a result, the preservation of the acquired 
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firm would be less needed, making the absorption a more likely choice. The results 
of this study provide support for the proposed hypotheses. As such, this study 
contributes to acquisition literature by showing that the decisions regarding the 
post-acquisition governance of the acquired firm may not also be driven by the 
resources and capabilities specific to its internal operations but also by the 
resources and capabilities that are shared across the acquired firm’s alliances. 
Finally, this study also adds to the alliance research by highlighting that the 
implications of alliances may extend beyond the firm outcomes to choices 
regarding the organizational structure of the firm. 
 Taken together, I aimed to stimulate both the scholarly and corporate 
debate on what types of alliances firms are engaged in and what are the 
consequences of acquisitions bringing along alliances. This dissertation 
contributes to the alliance research in two main ways. First, I shift the theoretical 
lens on alliances towards differentiating between different origins of alliances, and 
highlights that the inherited alliances have different characteristics and 
consequently implications from the homegrown alliances. Second, I highlight that 
the alliance reconfiguration does not always origin from within the alliance but can 
also be caused by an alliance partner acquisition by a third firm. Next to alliance 
research, this dissertation also adds to the acquisition research. Firstly, I highlight 
that the acquisition implications go beyond the acquirers and extend to the 
alliances and the inherited alliance partners. Second, I point to fact that the 
acquired firm can play a more active role than what has been previously assumed 
in the literature. Third, I also show that the resources of the acquired firm can 
provide access to its resources that are specific to its internal operations but also to 
resources that are shared and embedded in its alliances, and that these differences 
may influence the acquiring firm’s ability to effectively manage the value-creating 
opportunities and reduce the value-disrupting risks associated with inherited 
alliances. Finally, this dissertation invites managers to look beyond the acquired 
firm and think more broadly on what an acquisition may entail, what thereof 













Om interne middelen en capaciteiten aan te vullen, vormen bedrijven strategische 
allianties met andere organisaties en kopen ze een andere organisatie. Tot nog toe 
heeft onderzoek naar strategische allianties en overnamen los van elkaar gekeken, 
maar in praktijk zien wij dat strategische allianties vaak onderdeel kunnen zijn van 
de overnames. Met name wanneer een bedrijf een ander bedrijf overneemt, kan het 
worden geconfronteerd met de allianties van het overgenomen bedrijf. In mijn 
proefschrift verwijs ik naar dit specifieke type alliantie als een geërfde alliantie - 
het strategische partnerschap van een overgenomen bedrijf dat een overnemende 
onderneming via een overname erft. Door het bestuderen van geërfde allianties, 
zijn we in staat om belangrijke inzichten te verwerven in, en een beter begrip te 
krijgen van, de unieke kenmerken die de geërfde allianties verschillend maken van 
de zelf-geïnitieerde allianties. De kerndoelstelling van dit proefschrift is daarom 
om ons begrip van het fenomeen van geërfde allianties te vergroten, nieuwe 
inzichten te creëren over de oorsprong van allianties en de implicaties daarvan. Om 
deze kerndoelstelling te onderzoeken, heb ik drie empirische studies uitgevoerd, 
waarbij zowel inzichten uit de praktijk, als rijke secundaire data uit de 
biotechnologische industrie zijn gebruikt. 
In het eerste project onderzoek ik het fenomeen van geërfde allianties eerst 
door interviews af te nemen met leidinggevenden in de biotechnologie. Het 
veldmateriaal laat zien dat i) geërfde allianties wezenlijk verschillen van zelf-
geïnitieerde allianties, ii) geërfde allianties kunnen zowel unieke uitdagingen als 
kansen meebrengen en iii) deze uitdagingen en kansen kunnen verschillen, 
afhankelijk van het type alliantie zelf. Op basis van de inzichten uit de uitgevoerde 
interviews, test ik de impact van de geërfde allianties in de alliantieportefeuille op 
de financiële prestaties van bedrijven. Met behulp van een paneldataset met 
alliantie-activiteiten van 39 top biotechnologiebedrijven, merk ik dat de geërfde 
allianties, vooral die van exploratieve aard, de financiële prestaties bedrijven 
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positief beïnvloeden. Met betrekking tot de bijdragen aan het strategisch alliantie 
onderzoek, benadrukken de bevindingen hoe belangrijk het is om onderscheid te 
maken tussen verschillende oorsprongen van allianties, aangezien hun impact 
verschilt. Deze studie laat ook zien dat om de implicaties van acquisities adequaat 
te evalueren, het niet voldoende is om een atomistisch perspectief te nemen. In 
plaats daarvan is het belangrijk om te erkennen dat de overgenomen bedrijven 
mogelijk zijn ingebed in een breder netwerk dat ook de prestaties van de 
overnemende onderneming kan beïnvloeden. 
In het tweede project bestudeer ik de navigerende rol van het overgenomen 
bedrijf in de veerkracht van een alliantie na een overname van een alliantiepartner 
door een derde partij. Ik beargumenteer dat de geërfde allianties twee 
kernuitdagingen vormen voor het overnemende bedrijf: informatie-asymmetrie en 
coördinatieproblemen. In deze studie betoog ik ook dat het overgenomen bedrijf 
kan helpen bij het omgaan met deze uitdagingen door zich op te stellen als 
kennisdeling- en relationele bemiddelaar. Ik test vier hypothesen waaronder het 
overgenomen bedrijf de veerkracht van de geërfde alliantie voor de verwerving van 
een alliantiepartner waarschijnlijk zal verbeteren. Gebaseerd op een kwantitatieve 
analyse van 213 geërfde allianties, vind ik bewijs voor twee hypothesen. Om precies 
te zijn, de pre-acquisitie alliantie duur en de bewaarintegratiestrategie zorgen dat 
een geërfde alliantie een hogere waarschijnlijkheid heeft om veerkrachtiger te zijn. 
Ik vond geen steun voor noch de impact van de technologische verbondenheid noch 
eerdere alliantiebanden tussen het overgenomen bedrijf en de geërfde 
alliantiepartner. De resultaten impliceren dat de partner-specifieke ervaring 
binnen een alliantie en bewaarintegratiestrategie van het overgenomen bedrijf de 
geërfde alliantie helpen om bestand te zijn tegen en te herstellen van de overname 
van de alliantiepartners. Wat de onderzoekbijdragen betreft, wijst deze studie op 
de actieve rol die het overgenomen bedrijf kan spelen in de veerkracht van de 
geërfde alliantie na een overname. 
In de derde en laatste studie richt ik me op de rol van de geërfde allianties 
in de integratiekeuzes na de overname en het modererende effect van de eerdere 
alliantiebinding tussen de acquirerende en de overgenomen onderneming. 
Gebaseerd op de inzichten uit de literatuur over allianties en acquisities, ontwikkel 
ik hypothesen en test deze op 100 acquisitieovereenkomsten in de biotechnologie-
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industrie. Ik beargumenteer dat wanneer er meer geërfde allianties zijn bij een 
acquisitie, er een grotere spreiding van de resources en een groter aantal interactie 
momenten nodig is om toegang tot deze resources te krijgen. Het is dus 
waarschijnlijker dat het overnemende bedrijf, het overgenomen bedrijf niet 
absorbeert maar preserveert. Ik geef ook theoretische argumentatie dat de 
acquirerende partij, als het overnemende en verworven bedrijf een voorafgaande 
alliantie hadden, de gelegenheid heeft gehad om te leren hoe het overgenomen 
bedrijf samenwerkt en zo een goed begrip heeft opgebouwd van hoe het zou moeten 
omgaan met de allianties van het overgenomen bedrijf. Als gevolg hiervan zou het 
behouden van het overgenomen bedrijf minder nodig zijn, waardoor de absorptie 
een meer waarschijnlijke keuze is. De resultaten van deze studie bieden 
ondersteuning voor de voorgestelde hypothesen. Als zodanig draagt dit onderzoek 
bij aan de acquisitieliteratuur door te laten zien dat de beslissingen met betrekking 
tot de post-acquisitie organisatiestructuur van de overgenomen onderneming 
mogelijk niet worden gestuurd door de middelen en mogelijkheden die specifiek 
aan de interne activiteiten zijn, maar ook door de middelen en mogelijkheden die 
worden gedeeld met de allianties van de overgenomen firma. Ten slotte draagt deze 
studie ook bij aan het alliantieonderzoek door te benadrukken dat de implicaties 
van allianties verder reiken dan de bedrijfsresultaten, naar keuzes met betrekking 
tot de organisatiestructuur van het bedrijf. 
Alles bij elkaar beoogde ik zowel het wetenschappelijke als het zakelijke 
debat te stimuleren over met wat voor soort allianties, bedrijven zich bezighouden 
en wat de gevolgen zijn van overnames die allianties bevatten. Dit proefschrift 
draagt op twee manieren bij aan het strategisch alliantie onderzoek. Ten eerste 
verschuif ik de theoretische lens van allianties naar het differentiëren tussen 
verschillende oorsprongen van allianties, en benadruk ik dat de geërfde allianties 
verschillende kenmerken en consequenties hebben van de zelf-geïnitieerde 
allianties. Ten tweede, benadruk ik dat de herconfiguratie van de allianties niet 
altijd afkomstig is van binnen de alliantie, maar ook kan worden veroorzaakt door 
een overname van een alliantiepartner door een derde bedrijf. Naast 
alliantieonderzoek draagt dit proefschrift ook bij aan het acquisitieonderzoek. 
Allereerst benadruk ik dat de implicaties van acquisitie verder rijken dan de 
prestaties van de acquirerende partijen en zich uitstrekken tot de allianties en de 
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geërfde alliantiepartners. Ten tweede wijs ik erop dat het overgenomen bedrijf een 
actievere rol kan spelen dan wat eerder in de literatuur werd aangenomen. Ten 
derde laat ik zien dat het overgenomen bedrijf toegang biedt tot zijn middelen die 
specifiek zijn voor zijn interne activiteiten, maar ook tot middelen die worden 
gedeeld en ingebed zijn in allianties, en dat deze van verschillende invloed kunnen 
zijn op het vermogen van het wervende bedrijf om effectief de waarde-creërende 
mogelijkheden te verhogen en de waarde-verstorende risico's van geërfde allianties 
te verminderen. Tot slot nodigt dit proefschrift managers uit om verder te kijken 
dan het overgenomen bedrijf en meer in het algemeen na te denken over wat een 
acquisitie kan inhouden, wat de consequenties daarvan kunnen zijn en hoe deze 








Aby uzupełnić wewnętrzne zasoby i umiejętności, firmy tworzą alianse strategiczne 
z innymi organizacjami oraz przejmują inne firmy. Podczas gdy tradycyjnie 
badania przyglądały się oddzielnie aliansom strategicznym i przejęciom, alianse 
strategiczne mogą często być powiązane w transakcjach przejęcia. W szczególności, 
gdy firma nabywa inną firmę, może zostać skonfrontowana z aliansami przejętej 
firmy. W mojej pracy doktorskiej odnoszę się do tego specyficznego typu aliansu 
jako odziedziczonego aliansu – strategiczna kooperacja przejętej firmy, którą firma 
przejmująca dziedziczy w wyniku przejęcia. Poprzez studiowanie odziedziczonych 
aliansów, jesteśmy w stanie uzyskać ważne informacje na temat ich specyficznych 
cech, które sprawiają, że odziedziczone alianse różnią się od aliansów zawartych z 
własnej inicjatywy. Podstawowym celem tej pracy doktorskiej jest zatem lepsze 
zrozumienie fenomenu odziedziczonych aliansów, dostarczenie nowych 
spostrzeżeń na temat pochodzenia aliansów i ich implikacji. Aby rozwiązać ten 
podstawowy cel badawczy, przeprowadziłam trzy badania empiryczne na temat 
dziedziczonych aliansów, wykorzystując wiedzę praktyków, a także bogate dane 
wtórne z branży biotechnologicznej. 
W pierwszym projekcie wpierw badam zjawisko odziedziczonych aliansów 
przeprowadzając wywiady z menadżerami i ekspertami z branży 
biotechnologicznej. Wyniki przeprowadzonych  rozmów wskazują, że i) 
odziedziczone alianse znacznie różnią się od aliansów zawartych z własnej 
inicjatywy, ii) odziedziczone alianse mogą zarówno przynieść wyjątkowe wyzwania 
i możliwości,  jak i iii) te wyzwania i możliwości mogą się różnić w zależności od 
rodzaju samego aliansu. Opierając się na informacjach z wywiadów, testuję wpływ 
odziedziczonych aliansów na wyniki finansowe firm. Korzystając z zestawu danych 
panelowych obejmującego alianse 39 największych firm biotechnologicznych, 
stwierdzam, że odziedziczone alianse, zwłaszcza o charakterze eksploracyjnym, 
pozytywnie wpływają na wyniki finansowe firmy. Odnośnie implikacji, wyniki 
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badań w tym rozdziale podkreślają znaczenie rozróżnienia między różnym 
pochodzeniem aliansów, ponieważ ich wpływ na firmy jest niejednakowy. Badania 
te pokazują również, że aby odpowiednio ocenić konsekwencje przejęć firm, nie 
wystarczy przyjąć atomistyczną perspektywę na nabytą firmę. Zamiast tego ważne 
jest, aby spostrzec, że nabyte firmy mogą być osadzone w szerszej sieci powiązań, 
co może również wpływać na wyniki firmy nabywającej. 
W drugim projekcie badam rolę nawigacyjną nabytej firmy w odporności 
aliansu na przejęcie partnera przez firmę niezwiązaną z aliansem. Twierdzę, że 
odziedziczone alianse stwarzają dwa główne wyzwania dla firmy przejmującej: 
informacyjna asymetria i problemy z koordynacją. W tym badaniu twierdzę 
również, że przejęta firma może pomóc w pokonaniu tych wyzwań, grając role 
brokera wiedzy i mediatora relacyjnego. Testuję cztery hipotezy, w których nabyta 
firma może poprawić odporność odziedziczonego aliansu na przejęcie partnera 
przez firmę niezwiązaną z aliansem. W oparciu o analizę ilościową 213 
odziedziczonych aliansów, znalazłam potwierdzenie dla dwóch hipotez. W 
szczególności czas trwania aliansu przed przejęciem oraz wyodrębnienie nabytej 
firmy sprawiają, że odziedziczony alians jest bardziej odporny. Nie znalazłam 
potwierdzenia ani dla wpływu powiązań technologicznych, ani wcześniejszych 
aliansów między przejętą firmą a odziedziczonym partnerem sojuszu. Wyniki 
sugerują, że doświadczenie specyficzne dla partnera w ramach konkretnego aliansu 
oraz wyodrębnienie przejętej firmy pomagają odziedziczonemu aliansowi 
przetrwać i odzyskać siły po przejęciu partnera. Jeśli chodzi o implikacje, badania 
przeprowadzone w tym rozdziale wskazują na aktywną rolę, jaką nabyta firma może 
odegrać w wypracowaniu odporności aliansu po przejęciu partnera. 
W trzecim i ostatnim projekcie skupiam się na roli odziedziczonych 
aliansów w decyzjach dotyczących  integracji nabytej firmy i łagodzącym wpływie 
wcześniejszego powiązania aliansem między firmą przejmującą a przejętą. 
Opierając się na spostrzeżeniach z literatury o strategicznych aliansach i 
przejęciach, stawiam hipotezy i testuję je, opierając się na 100 transakcjach 
przejęcia w przemyśle biotechnologicznym. Twierdzę, że im więcej odziedziczonych 
aliansów w danej transakcji przejęcia firmy, tym mamy do czynienia z większym 
rozproszeniem zasobów i większą liczbą interfejsów do przejścia w celu uzyskania 
dostępu do tych zasobów. W konsekwencji firma przejmująca jest bardziej skłonna 
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do wyodrębnienia nabytej firmy. Podaję również argumentację teoretyczną, że gdy 
firma przejmująca i przejęta miała alians poprzedzający przejęcie, nabywca miał 
okazję dowiedzieć się, w jaki sposób nabyta firma współpracuje, a tym samym 
zbudował zrozumienie, w jaki sposób powinna radzić sobie z aliansami przejętej 
firmy. W rezultacie zachowanie nabytej firmy w nienaruszonej postaci byłoby mniej 
potrzebne, dzięki czemu wchłonięcie nabytej firmy do struktur firmy przejmującej 
byłoby bardziej prawdopodobnym wyborem. Wyniki tych badań potwierdzają 
proponowane hipotezy. W związku z tym niniejsze badania wzbogacają literaturę 
dotyczącą przejęć, pokazując, że decyzje dotyczące zarządzania przejętą firmą po 
przejęciu nie mogą być podejmowane tylko na podstawie zasobów i możliwości, 
które są wyłącznie przypisywane jej wewnętrznym operacjom, ale także z 
uwzględnieniem zasobów i możliwości, które są dzielone i zawarte w aliansach 
nabytej firmy. Wreszcie, niniejsze badania wnoszą do istniejących badań 
naukowych na temat strategicznych aliansów, podkreślając, że alianse mogą 
wpływać nie tylko na wyniki finansowe firmy przejmującej, ale także na wybory 
dotyczące struktury organizacyjnej firmy. 
Podsumowując, starałam się pobudzić zarówno naukową, jak i 
korporacyjną debatę na temat rodzajów aliansów, w których zaangażowane są 
firmy i jakie są konsekwencje przejęć, które zawierają odziedziczone alianse. Ta 
praca doktorska przyczynia się do rozwoju badań o strategicznych aliansach na dwa 
główne sposoby. Po pierwsze, przesunęłam teoretyczne spojrzenie na alianse w 
kierunku rozróżnienia między różnym pochodzeniem aliansów i podkreślam, że 
odziedziczone alianse mają specyficzne cechy i w konsekwencji ich implikacje 
różnią się od implikacji aliansów zawartych z własnej inicjatywy. Po drugie, 
podkreśliłam, że rekonfiguracja aliansu nie zawsze pochodzi z wnętrza aliansu, ale 
może być również spowodowana przejęciem partnera przez trzecią firmę. Obok 
badań nad strategicznymi aliansami, niniejsza rozprawa uzupełnia również 
badania nad przejęciami. Po pierwsze, podkreśliłam, że konsekwencje przejęcia 
wykraczają poza nabywców i obejmują alianse oraz odziedziczonych partnerów 
aliansów. Po drugie, zwróciłam uwagę na fakt, że nabyta firma może odgrywać 
bardziej aktywną rolę niż jak dotychczas zakładano w literaturze. Po trzecie, 
pokazałam również, że przejęta firm może zapewnić nie tylko dostęp do zasobów, 
które są specyficzne dla jej wewnętrznych operacji, ale także do zasobów, które są 
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wspólne i osadzone w jej aliansach, oraz że różnice w lokalizacji zasobów mogą 
wpłynąć na zdolność firmy przejmującej do skutecznego zarządzania potencjałem i 
ryzykiem związanymi z odziedziczonymi aliansami. Wreszcie, niniejsza praca 
doktorska zachęca menedżerów do spojrzenia poza granice nabytej firmy, a także 
do szerszego zastanowienia się, co pociąga za sobą przejęcie, jakie mogą być jego 









Um die eigenen Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten zu ergänzen, können Unternehmen 
strategische Allianzen schließen oder andere Unternehmen übernehmen. Während 
in der bisherigen Forschung die Formierung einer strategischen Allianz oder 
Durchführung einer Unternehmensübernahme jeweils als aktive strategische 
Entscheidungen betrachtet wurden, passiert es häufig, dass strategische Allianzen 
im Rahmen  Unternehmensübernahme passiv mit übernommen wird. Wenn ein 
Unternehmen ein anderes übernimmt, kann es somit sein, dass es mit den 
Allianzen des erworbenen Unternehmens konfrontiert wird. Die vorliegende 
Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit sogenannten „geerbten Allianzen“, das heißt 
strategische Allianzen, die im Rahmen einer Übernahme mit übernommen 
werden. Die Untersuchung „geerbter Allianzen“ ermöglicht eine differenzierte 
Analyse der Eigenschaften, welche „geerbten Allianzen“ von selbstinitiierten 
Allianzen unterscheiden. Das Hauptziel der Dissertation ist es, das Verständnis 
über „geerbte Allianzen“ zu verbessern und neue Erkenntnisse über die Entstehung 
von Allianzen und deren Auswirkungen zu gewinnen. Um dieses zentrale 
Forschungsziel zu erreichen, werden drei empirische Studien durchgeführt. Dabei 
wurden Erkenntnisse von Praktikern sowie neuartige und umfangreiche 
Sekundärdaten aus der Biotechnologie-Industrie verwendet. 
Das erste Projekt untersucht zunächst das Phänomen „geerbter Allianzen“ 
mithilfe von Interviews mit Managern aus der Biotechnologie-Branche. Die 
Interviews zeigen, dass i) geerbte Allianzen sich erheblich von selbstinitiierten 
Allianzen unterscheiden, ii) geerbte Allianzen sowohl einzigartige 
Herausforderungen als auch Chancen mit sich bringen können, und iii) sich diese 
Herausforderungen und Chancen je nach Art der Allianz unterscheiden können. 
Basierend auf den qualitativen Erkenntnissen werden die Auswirkungen von 
geerbten Allianzen eines Unternehmens auf den finanziellen Erfolg der 
Unternehmen quantitativ getestet. Die Ergebnisse einer Paneldatenanalyse von 39 
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führenden Biotechnologie-Unternehmen und deren Allianzen zeigt, dass geerbten 
Allianzen die finanzielle Performance des Unternehmens positiv beeinflussen, vor 
allem dann wenn sie einen explorativen Charakter haben. Die Ergebnisse deuten 
also darauf hin, dass es wichtig ist, zwischen den verschiedenen Entstehungsarten 
von Allianzen zu unterscheiden, da ihre Auswirkungen auf die Performance sehr 
unterschiedlich sind. Die Resultaten der Studie zeigen auch, dass die 
Auswirkungen einer Übernahme sich auf das Netzwerk des Zielunternehmens 
erstrecken und dieses Netzwerk ein wichtigen Einfluss auf den Erfolg den 
übernehmenden Unternehmens hat. 
In der zweiten Studie wird die Rolle des übernommenen Unternehmens 
bei der Widerstandsfähigkeit  einer Allianz gegenüber einer Übernahme eines 
Allianzpartners untersucht. Ein wichtiges Argument ist, dass geerbten Allianzen 
das übernehmende Unternehmen vor zwei Herausforderungen stellt: 
Informationsasymmetrie und Koordinationsprobleme. Zudem wird argumentiert, 
dass das erworbene Unternehmen dabei helfen kann, diese Herausforderungen zu 
meistern, indem es eine Rolle als Wissensvermittler und Beziehungsvermittler 
spielt. In der empirischen Analyse werden vier Hypothesen getestet, unter denen 
das erworbene Unternehmen wahrscheinlich die Widerstandsfähigkeit der 
geerbten Allianz gegenüber einer Übernahme eines Allianzpartners verbessern 
wird. Eine quantitative Analyse von 213 „geerbten Allianzen“ bestätigt zwei der 
Hypothesen. Insbesondere die Dauer der Allianz vor der Übernahme und die 
Erhaltungsintegrationsstrategie machen eine „geerbte Allianz“ widerstandsfähiger 
gegenüber einer Übernahme eines Allianzpartners. Im Gegensatz dazu haben die 
technologische Verwandtschaft  zwischen dem erworbenen Unternehmen und dem 
vererbten Allianzpartner oder frühere Allianzen zwischen diesen zwei Parteien 
keinen statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf die Widerstandsfähigkeit. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die partnerschaftliche Erfahrung innerhalb einer Allianz 
und die Erhaltung des erworbenen Unternehmens der „geerbten Allianz“ helfen, 
die Übernahme der Allianzpartner zu wiederstehen. Die Studie liefert wichtige 
Beiträge zum Verständnis des Einflusses, den das erworbene Unternehmen nach 




Das letzte Projekt konzentriert sich auf die Rolle der „geerbten Allianzen“ 
hinsichtlich der Integrationsentscheidungen nach der Übernahme und auf den 
abschwächenden Effekt der vorherigen Allianz zwischen dem übernehmenden und 
dem erworbenen Unternehmen auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den geerbten 
Allianzen und den Integrationsentscheidungen. Basierend auf den Erkenntnissen 
aus der Allianz- und Übernahmeliteratur werden zwei Hypothesen entwickelt und 
anhand eines Datensatzes von 100 Übernahmen in der Biotechnologiebranche 
getestet. Konkret wird dabei argumentiert, dass eine höhere Anzahl geerbter 
Allianzen, die Hürden für den Ressourcenzugang erhöhen, da die Ressourcen 
stärker verteilt sind und mehr Schnittstellen bestehen. Folglich wird das 
übernehmende Unternehmen das erworbene Unternehmen eher als eine 
Tochtergesellschaft erhalten. Darüber hinaus wird argumentiert, dass der 
kaufende Unternehmen, als das übernehmende und übernommene Unternehmen 
eine Allianz vor der Übernahme eingegangen waren, die Möglichkeit hatte, zu 
erfahren, wie das erworbene Unternehmen zusammenarbeitet, und ein 
Verständnis dafür entwickelte, wie sie mit den Allianzen des erworbenen 
Unternehmens umgehen soll. Infolgedessen ist die Erhaltung des erworbenen 
Unternehmens weniger erforderlich, wodurch die strukturelle Absorption des 
erworbenen Unternehmens wahrscheinlicher wird. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie 
bestätigen die theoretischen Vorhersagen. Die Studie leistet einen Beitrag zur 
Akquisitionsliteratur, indem sie zeigt, dass die Entscheidungen hinsichtlich der 
Governance des erworbenen Unternehmens nach der Akquisition möglicherweise 
nicht nur von den internen Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten abhängen, sondern auch 
von den gemeinsam genutzten Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten, die in den Allianzen 
des erworbenen Unternehmens eingebettet sind. Außerdem trägt die Studie auch 
zur Allianzforschung bei, indem sie hervorhebt, dass die Auswirkungen von 
Allianzen über die Unternehmensergebnisse hinaus auf Entscheidungen in Bezug 
auf die Organisationsstruktur des Unternehmens hinausgehen können. 
Zusammenfassend soll die Dissertation bestehende Debatte über 
Allianztypen und deren Auswirkungen im Kontext von Unternehmensübernahmen 
anregen und voranbringen. Diese Dissertation trägt auf zwei Arten zur 
Allianzforschung bei. Erstens verlagert sie die theoretische Perspektive auf 
Allianzen, indem sie verschiedenen Entstehungsformen von Allianzen differenziert 
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und gleichzeitig hervorhebt, dass „geerbten Allianzen“ andere Eigenschaften und 
folglich andere Auswirkungen auf Unternehmenserfolg haben als selbstinitiierten 
Allianzen. Zweitens wird betont, dass Umgestaltungen des Allianzporfolios nicht 
immer durch Allianzcharakteristika und deren Erfolg bedingt sind, sondern auch 
durch die Übernahme eines Allianzpartners durch ein drittes Unternehmen 
verursacht werden kann. Neben der Allianzforschung trägt diese Dissertation auch 
zur Akquisitionsforschung bei. Zunächst wird betont, dass die Auswirkungen einer 
Unternehmensübernahmen über die unmittelbare Dyade hinaus gehen und sich 
gleichermaßen auf die „geerbten“ Allianzpartner erstrecken. Zweitens wird gezeigt, 
dass das erworbene Unternehmen eine aktivere Rolle in der Periode nach der 
Übernahme spielen kann, als dies bisher in der Literatur angenommen wurde. 
Drittens wird betont, dass das erworbene Unternehmen Zugriff auf seine 
Ressourcen bieten kann, die für seine internen Abläufe spezifisch sind, aber auch 
auf Ressourcen, die geteilt und in den Allianzen eingebettet sind. Nicht zuletzt 
bietet die Arbeit diverse praktische Implikationen: Manager sollten bei einer 
Unternehmensübernahme nicht nur die direkten Auswirkungen betrachten, 
sondern umfassend darüber nachzudenken, was eine Übernahme mit sich bringen 
kann, welche Konsequenzen dies haben kann und wie diese effektiv gestaltet 
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 When one chapter in life ends, a new one is waiting to be written. After the 
PhD I decided to join KPMG Advisory N.V. in Amstelveen. I would like to thank my 
superiors and colleagues from the Strategy & Operations, Financial Sector 
department for the warm welcome and enthusiasm about having a PhDer on-
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